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The dividend behaviour of NYSE-listed banks within an optimal control theory 
framework 
ABSTRACT 
Within the dividend policy literature there is no universally accepted model to explain 
dividend behaviour. The theoretical dividend policy literature contains a promising 
dynamic mathematical model based on optimal control theory formulated by Davidson 
(1980), in the spirit of the Modigliani-Brumberg-Yaari types of lifecyle hypothesis, but 
despite being published some time ago the model has not been tested empirically, 
possibly due to its complexity. It is the main purpose of this research study to 
investigate the dividend behaviour patterns of banks listed on the NYSE within this 
optimal control theory framework. 
This work unfolds in three stages as follows: initially the impacts of the different 
control planning horizons in determining dividend patterns are examined. Secondly, 
the factors that govern the control-theoretic dividend patterns are established. Finally 
the factors that are associated with out-performers of the control theory framework 
are identified. 
Appropriate and relevant data from NYSE banking corporations were obtained to test 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the control theory framework. The application of 
logistic regression analysis and logistic step-wise regression established the factors 
that govern the control-theoretic dividend patterns. The application of multiple 
regression analysis and step-wise regression analysis enabled this study to 
determine the factors that are associated with out-performers of the control theory 
framework. 
Research findings suggest that the long planning horizon model tends to be good 
explanator of observed dividends, suggesting that the dividend decision is not 
constrained by short or medium term predicted liquid asset levels. NYSE banks with 
control-theoretic dividend patterns were associated with the smaller banks, which 
perform financially well and display a strong share price record, as indicated by the 
high Tobin's Q ratio, strong dividend yield, a greater return on capital invested, higher 
leverage, and a smaller number of employees. The NYSE banks with observed 
dividends that out-perform the control theory framework are associated with banks 
that have higher profits, as indicated by the higher return on equity, and an implied 
expanding customer base, as suggested by the higher revenue growth rate. Out- 
perfoming banks also have higher dividend yields, constrained by an implied 
internally imposed conservative retention policy, as indicated by lower payout ratios 
and they tend to be smaller in size. 
Further research in this area is required to investigate the dividend behaviour of 
organisations operating on other stock markets around the world, and should help to 
unlock the full potential that is offered by a control theory framework. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 contains the introduction to this thesis. It is divided into the following 
sections: Section 1.2 sets out the key issues that are investigated in this thesis and 
the importance of this research study. Section 1.3 outlines the structure of this thesis, 
and finally Section 1.4 concludes the chapter. 
1.2 Key issues and importance of the research 
Currently in the dividend policy literature there is no universally accepted model to 
explain dividend behaviour. However, dividend policy literature contains one 
promising mathematical model developed by Davidson (1980) based on an optimal 
control framework. However, this dividend determination model has not been tested 
empirically. It is the main purpose of this research study to subject this optimal control 
model to testing. 
The optimal control theory model has the advantage of being dynamic in nature (ie 
optimising across multiple time periods) rather than static. The nature of one of the 
key state variables, ie the liquid assets variable, makes the optimal control model well 
suited, prima-facie, to the banking industry as liquid assets are fundamental asset to 
banking corporations. In the control theory model, any liquidity contraints that take the 
form of either explicit terminal values at the planning horizon, or a trade-off between 
16 
the liquid asset and dividend levels, will give a significant weighting to the asset 
values when estimated over time. Where this is not the case, dynamics more closely 
related to the Lintner type of partial adjustment models (based only on earnings and 
lagged dividend) will result. The NYSE banks were selected also because of data 
availability, the large sample size, a spectrum of types of banks, and the NYSE stock 
market being the largest in the world by market capitalisation. 
This research study is also important because it is in response to the calls made in 
the literature which have urged researchers to examine further dividend determining 
models. Collins, Saxena and Wansley (1996), specifically called researchers to 
empirically conduct research into the area of dividend determination as some of the 
advanced models that have been successfully developed to determine dividends still 
remain untested. Davidson (1980) also called for empirical tests to be carried out on 
the optimal control theory framework for dividend determination. Although Davidson's 
work in this area is not recent, the perspective taken in this thesis is that it offers 
useful insights into a modern economic environment that have been largely 
overlooked. This particular research study, therefore, is a response to Davidson's 
(1980) appeal. 
Little work has been conducted on dividend determination of banks, and also 
Davidson's model had not been tested in this context, so the challenge here is to 
investigate the extent to which his model explains the dividend behaviour of banks 
listed on the NYSE. Therefore, all the key results of this research, contained in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7, enhance the current knowledge regarding the practical 
effectiveness and efficiency of the optimal control theory framework for dividend 
determination. 
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The importance of conducting research on dividend policy was identified by Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) who stated that the dividend policy of an organisation is 
particularly of importance to company directors because they set policies, to investors 
because they have to plan portfolios, and to economists because they seek to 
understand how capital markets function. 
Interest in optimal control for dividends has been sparked off by two very recent 
studies that were not published when this research work began. The following two 
brief examples demonstrate the interest that researchers have in developing dividend 
determining models and further work is required to move this process forward: 
9 Cadenillas, Sarkar, and Zapatero (2007) successfully modelled the optimal 
dividend strategy as a stochastic impulse control problem. They also found a 
formula for the expected time between dividend payments. A crucial and 
surprising result of their paper is that, as the dividend tax rate decreases, it is 
optimal for the shareholders to receive smaller but more frequent dividend 
payments. 
" Cadenillas, Choulli, Taksar and Zhang (2006) present the classical and 
impulse stochastic control model for dividend optimisation for a financial or an 
insurance entity which can control its business activities. The classical and 
impulse stochastic control model can enable the firm to reduce the business 
risk. The model presented controls the timing and the amount of dividends paid 
out to the shareholders. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This study unfolds in three stages. The initial phase (first stage) involves investigating 
the impact of the control planning horizons and establishing the control planning 
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horizon for each NYSE bank. Full details of the work carried out in stage one, and the 
results of this aspect of the research, are contained in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The intermediate phase (second stage) of this study applies the advanced logistic 
regression analysis and advanced logistic stepwise regression analysis to identify 
whether there are key factors that govern the suitability of the optimal control theory 
model for dividend determination. The presence of the identified factors in a NYSE - 
listed banking corporation would indicate that the bank has a good chance of being 
able to apply the optimal control theory model for dividend determination successfully. 
Chapter 6 contains relevant information regarding the work carried out in the 
intermediate phase of this research project. 
The final phase (third stage) in Chapter 7 identifies the factors that explain the 
charecteristics of out-performing banks. The application of multiple regression 
analysis and stepwise regression enables this study to identify the required factors 
effectively. 
Diagram 1.3 below details the structure of this thesis 
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Diagram 1.3 - The thesis structure 
CHAPTER 1 
introduction to this thesis 
CHAPTER 2 
Literature review on 
dividend policy 
CHAPTER 3 
The optimal control theory 
model 
CHAPTER 4 
Research methodology 
CHAPTER 5 
An investigation of the 
impact of the control 
planning horizon in 
predicting dividends 
CHAPTER 8 
Thesis conclusions, research limitations and future research 
CHAPTER 6 
Identifying factors that 
govern suitability of the 
control theory model 
CHAPTER 7 
Identifying the factors 
associated with out- 
performing banks 
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This thesis is divided into eight different chapters as clearly displayed in Diagram 1.3 
above. 
This thesis has been introduced in Chapter 1 which gives a brief overview of the 
research project. Chapter 2 reviews published literature on dividend policy. Chapter 3 
presents the optimal control theory framework as presented by Davidson (1980). The 
research methodology applied to conduct this research study is detailed in Chapter 4. 
Details of the practical work carried out and findings attained in this research 
project are contained in Chapter 5 through to Chapter 7. Thus, Chapter 5 
investigates the impact of the control planning horizons in predicting dividends, while 
Chapter 6 identifies the factors that govern suitability of the control theory model and 
Chapter 7 ascertains the factors that are associated with out-performing banks. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 1 has set the scene for this research study by: 
9 detailing the key aims of this research project, 
" specifying the key reasons which motivate this research work, and 
0 presenting the structure of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIVIDEND POLICY 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to present the relevant published literature on dividend policy. 
Chapter 2 is divided into five parts. Section 2.2 defines dividend policy. Section 2.3 
identifies and dicusses some key issues in dividend policy. Section 2.4 identifies the 
main factors that past research presents as factors that influence dividend policy. As 
very little research has been done to investigate specifically the dividend policy of US 
banks Section 2.5, discloses and discusses the findings from research that has been 
conducted only on US banking corporations' dividend policy. The findings of Section 
2.5 will be compared to the general literature on dividend policy and relevant 
similarities and differences noted. Finally Section 2.6 concludes Chapter 2. 
2.2 What is dividend policy? 
A dividend is simply defined by Sutton (2004) as a distribution to the firm's 
shareholders, usually from its profits and in cash. ' Directors of companies are also 
confronted with a dilemma of whether or not to offer non-cash dividends to 
shareholders or offer share buy backs. Non-cash dividends and share buy backs 
have been reported to be on the increase and further discussions of share buy backs 
are contained in section 2.3.11 of this thesis. 
Dividend policy is the guidelines and procedures that a company follows to decide 
how much it will pay out to shareholders in dividends. 1.2 
' Sutton, T. (2004), Corporate financial accounting and reporting, Prentice Hall- Financial Times, 
second edition. 
Van Horne, J. C. (1995), Financial Management and Policy, Tenth edition, Prentice Hall International 
Edition. 
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A company decides whether to retain the profits made within the company, or to pay 
profits out to the owners of the firm in the form of dividends. Once the company 
decides on whether to pay dividends, they may establish a somewhat permanent 
dividend policy, which may in turn impact on investors and analysts' perceptions. 
What they decide depends on the assessed situation of the company now and in the 
future. It also depends on the preferences of investors and potential investors. 3 
A dividend is distributed to shareholders on a specific date. When a dividend is 
declared it becomes a current liability of the firm and cannot be rescinded (cancelled). 
Lumby, S. and Jones, C. (2003), Corporate Finance Theory and Practice, 7"' Edition Thomson. 
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Table 2.2 The method of dividend payment - An example 
Thursday 15th Friday 26`h January Friday 30th January Monday 16th 
January Ex-dividend date Record date February 
Declaration date Dividend 
payment date 
The board of A share is sold ex-dividend on This is the date on which the The dividend 
directors this date. The seller is entitled company reviews its records cheques are 
declares a to keep dividends. Under the to establish the shareholders mailed to 
payment of NYSE rules shares are traded of the company. An investor shareholders on 
dividends. ex-dividend on and after the must be listed on this date as record. 
fourth business day before the a 'holder of record' to have 
record date. (Investors should the right to dividends. A 
buy before this date if they want 'holder of record' is the 
the dividends). person named on the 
company register as the 
owner of a security who has 
the right to dividends. 
2.3 Key challenges in dividend policy 
The following are the different challenges that the literature has identified as facing 
dividend policy considerations. 
2.3.1 Issues of modelling dividend behaviour 
Little success has been achieved in using theories such as signalling and agency to 
build models that explain observed dividend behaviour. According to Davidson 
(1980), the dividend models that have been reported to give disappointing results are 
the frameworks that are constructed to maximise the value of the equity interest in a 
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company, for which the policy function in these models are linear in the present value 
of dividends and this leads to linear Hamiltonians, which give `bang bang' solutions 
except in the cases of `microscopic degeneracy' (ie when a whole range of payouts 
are equally valued). 
Dividend policy literature contains some complex and some simple models that 
work reasonably well in explaining the change of dividends within companies over 
time. Some interesting simple empirical time series models that have potentially 
shown ability to explain dividend behaviour are the partial adjustment (PA) model, 
formulated in 1956 by Lintner, distributed lag (DL) model, formulated in (1954) by 
Koyk and adaptive expectations (AE) model, formulated in 1958 by Nerlove. 
The three simple time series models the PA, DL and AE are all important to this 
research study; firstly, because they are dynamic models just like the optimal control 
theory framework presented by Davidson (1980) and they all determine the behaviour 
of dividends over time, but yet they are different models in nature. The three simple 
time series models mentioned above are all ad hoc empirical dynamic models, 
whereas the optimal control theory framework discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis is 
a theoretical dynamic model consistent with the managerial framework proposed by 
King (1977). 
Secondly, the partial adjustment and the adaptive expectations models are 
important to this thesis, because the intertemporal changes of dividends in the 
optimal control theory framework presented by Davidson (1980) can be expressed in 
a way that exhibits similarities to the reduced form time series equations of these 
empirical models, which perform quite well in explaining dividend changes between 
periods. The control theory model thus provides some interesting explanations (or 
parameterisations) of the reduced from coefficients. Chapter 3, section 3.3, details 
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how the reduced form time series equations have been utilised in the control model to 
establish such intertemporal changes of dividends. 
Davidson (1986) states that the PA, DL and AE models give reduced form 
equations that are equivalent, from the perspective of conventional estimation, so 
essentially they are regarded as being indistinguishable. The DL and AE models are 
themselves structurally the same and are both of similar form, but the structure of the 
DL and the AE models are not identical to the structure of Lintner's PA model. The 
reduced form equations of DL and AE are mainly distinguishable from the PA only by 
the presence of a serially correlated error term and the absence of a constant term. 
The reduced form equations of the PA, DL and AE are as follows: 
" Lintner's (1956) PA model 
Lintner (1956) based his partial adjustment model on interviews with the management 
of 28 industrial companies, which were selected for their diverse financial 
characteristics. The partial adjustment model states that when the directors set a 
dividend they have in mind a target dividend level. Now, 
D; t* = the target dividend payout, i. e. the proportion r; of the actual level of earnings 
E; t, and 
r; = the target payout ratio. 
Therefore: - 
D; t* = r; E; t = target dividend ..................................................... (i) 
The target dividend level mentioned above adjusts partially to the actual dividend 
level, according to the partial adjustment equation: 
Dot - Dec-1 = ai + cj( D*it- Di, c-, )+ Uzt .............................................. (ii) 
where: 
26 
a; = constant, which, as Lintner (1956) states, captures a reluctance by the directors to 
reduce dividends. 
c; = a constant (0 <c< 1) to reflect the speed at which actual dividend levels are 
adjusted by the directors to reach the target dividend level. 
U; t = is a random error term. 
Now, eliminating the target dividend level from equation 2 using equation 1 gives 
equation 3, below 
0 Dot = ai + ciriEit - ciDi, t-1 + Uic ............................ 
(iii) 
Equation 3 above simplifies to the form below: 
Dec = ßo + Pi Eßt + ß2 Di, c-l + U; t .................................. (iv) 
Where: 
D; t = dividend at time t 
Po = constant 
P, = c; r; = product of speed, at which actual dividend levels are adjusted by the 
directors to reach the target dividend level, and target payout ratio 
E; t = Earnings at time t 
P2 = -c = minus speed at which actual dividend levels are adjusted by the directors to 
reach the target dividend level. 
Hence c=-ß2 and r=- ßl/ß2 
D1, t_l = dividend at time t-1, and 
U; t = is a random error. 
Some assumptions that were made in the PA model by Lintner in 1956 were also 
adopted by Davidson 1980 in his optimal control theory framework and these include: 
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" Lintner assumed income to be exogenously determined and the income 
component Y(t) in Davidson's optimal control theory framework was treated as 
exogenous. 
" Lintner observed that investment policy seemed to have very little influence on 
dividends. Investment policy is considered by Davidson's control theory 
implicitly. The assumption of not explicitly considering investment policy is 
consistent with Fama's (1974) findings. 
Davidson (1986) finds that the partial adjustment (PA) model has some 
fundamental weaknesses. For example, the theoretical basis of the model is too 
simple and not robust enough as it does not incorporate the other key elements that 
are likely to influence dividend determination. Certainly the absence of a variable, 
such as the liquid assets, makes the partial adjustment model possibly unsuitable, 
prima facie, to the banking industry as liquid assets are fundamental assets to 
banking corporations. Researchers such as Davidson (1986) who extensively 
carried out empirical studies on the simple time series models such as the adaptive 
expectations, partial adjustment, and distributed lags models have concluded that 
observed dividends tend to adjust much less frequently than Lintner's model would 
suggest and that the implied loss function would result in zero parameter values. 
Also, the constant parameter in the model does not have a simple interpretation given 
to it (ie a `reluctance to reduce dividends'), and the payout values determined by the 
PA model can conflict with the empirical evidence. 
The above partial adjustment model by Lintner (1956) has the ability to explain 
aggregate dividend levels for companies, and the model attempts to explain dividend 
behaviour and does not add much theory to the underlying relevant literature on 
dividend determination. Gven some of these limitations to the PA model, this research 
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study will focus on the optimal control theory model instead which, prima facie, would 
seem to possess more potential, when applied to the banking industry, especially 
considering its treatment of liquid assets. 
" Koyk's (1954) Distributed Lag Model: 
The hypothesis of Koyk's (1954) distributed lag model views current dividends as a 
weighted series of current and past earnings. 
Therefore: 
Dt = yo Et + Yi Et-, + ... + Ut ............................ 
(v) 
where: 
D, = dividend in time t 
Yo, Yi, ... = weighting coefficients 
Et = earnings in time t 
Et_, = earnings in time t-1 
Un = error term 
A large number of the lagged independent variables above are most likely highly 
collinear and because of this the above equation (v) may not be very useful as it 
stands. 
To make equation (v) above more tractable, some assumptions have got to be 
made regarding the explanatory variables. If the weights are assumed to be related 
by a simple exponential decay factor so yt-, = yt .h 
(where 0 <h < 1) then the 
following distributed lag model results: 
O Dt=y0 Et-(1-h)Dt. 1+ Uc - hUt-, ................................ (vi) 
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This distributed lag model, as in equation (vi) above is sturctually similar to the 
adaptive expections model below (equation (ix)). Equation (vi) ( DL) model differs 
from Lintner's model ( equation (iii) ) in terms of the serially correlated error process 
contained by the DL model and the absence of the constant value which is present in 
the PA model. 
" Nerlove's (1958) Adaptive Expectations Model: 
Nerlove's AE model assumes that the firm's actual dividends Dt are a fixed proportion 
k of the long run earnings EL t with an error term Ut 
therefore: 
Dt =k ELt + Ut ................................................................... (vii) 
The long run earnings expectations are assumed to adjust accordingly as follows: 
................................................ EL t' EL t-1 =e( Et - Et-1) ......... ....... 
(viii) 
In equation (viii) above, e is the coefficient of the long run earnings expectations. 
The unobservable variables are eliminated and rearranging equation (vii) above in 
terms of ELt, substituting in equation (viii) and rearanging gives the following 
adaptive expectations model equation: 
D Dt = ek Et- k Dn-, + Ut + (k-1) Ut-, ............................................. (ix) 
The AE model contained in equation (ix) above is structurally similar to the DL model 
contined in equation (vi) and the AE also produces similar results to the PA model 
contained in equation (iii), however, the AE equation is not totally identical to equation 
(iii) of the PA model. 
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2.3.2 Difficulties faced by company directors 
Davidson (2002) confirms that directors of both public and private limited companies 
experience difficulties when: 
1. determining the appropriate level of dividends to be paid to shareholders, 
2. deciding whether or not to offer non-cash alternatives such as scrip dividends. 
He argues that these problems facing directors are not fully addressed in the 
literature on dividend policy for it does not offer unified best practice guidelines to 
company directors, when formulating corporate dividend polices. Since the dividend 
puzzle remains unsolved and the literature is disjointed and contradictory, the 
difficulties remain. Indeed, developing a unified rational corporate dividend policy is 
still a challenge facing finance academics even today. More work aimed at unifying 
dividend policy theory is required. The intention in this thesis is to apply the control 
theory model and establish to what extent it can explain dividend behaviour within a 
banking environment, hopefully creating new insights into this puzzle. 
2.3.3 The irrelevance of dividend policy in theory 
Miller and Modigliani (also known as MM) (1961) suggest that dividend policy is 
irrelevant in finance theory in a perfect tax - free capital market environment. This 
irrelevance theory argues that changes in dividends do not determine the value of the 
company in a perfect market. Miller and Modigliani's (1961) work suggests that it is 
the ability to generate earnings that ultimately determines the value of the company. 
The assumptions in Miller and Modigliani's (1961) analysis are that any new capital 
raised is on equivalent terms to retained earnings (the new capital is issued at its 
correct valuation with no issue costs incurred and new capital is a perfect substitute 
for retained earnings) and the firm's investment activities are independent of its 
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dividend policy. Therefore, since the retained earnings and new equity are perfect 
substitutes this leaves dividends undetermined by any given investment plan because 
new capital can always be raised when it is required for investments. MM's analysis 
is confined to all equity firms, whose investment plans are predetermined and known 
by all market participants. 
The irrelevance hypothesis put forward by MM (1961) is a logical extention of the 
position established in Modiglian and Miller (1958). MM's (1958) work on capital 
structure showed that under some implicit assumptions the value of a company is 
unaffected by the relative proportions of debt and equity in the company's capital 
structure. MM's (1958) research implicitly assumed that the debt and equity 
proportions in the capital structure do not affect the investment decision, as the new 
finance required is readily available from external sources. 
MM established, in the two papers mentioned above, that under the implied and 
idealized assumptions we can conclude that the investment (company's investment 
portfolio and share value), financing (debt and equity) and dividend decisions of a 
company are disjointed from each other and can be made independently. Therefore, 
according to MM any changes in the current dividends that the directors make are 
assumed not to affect the amount of capital available for investments as the firm is 
assumed above to get the new finance required from external sources, which are 
assumed to be readily available. MM ensures that all investments planned can be met 
under the irrelevance theory. 
MM's (1961) irrelevance theory is logical and consistent within a perfect market but 
the world is not a perfect market place and therefore the irrelevance theory does not 
help either: 
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" the theorist seeking to explain the behaviour of observed dividends or 
9 the practitioners (directors of organisations) who might seek information or 
assistance regarding determining the appropriate level of dividends to pay to 
shareholders. 
Management accounting studies (Horngren, Bhimani, Datar and Foster ( 2005), on 
investment appraisal techniques support MM's conclusions by utilising the relevant 
cash flows associated with the proposed project without simultaneously assessing 
how the proposed project will affect the financing (capital structure) and dividend 
policies of the company, (see Davidson, 2002). 
Bar Yosef and Kolodny (1976) state that when considering the textbook treatment 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) it is consistent with MM's conclusions by 
assuming dividend irrelevance implicitly, since CAPM rates of return make no 
distinction between dividend returns and capital gains. 
2.3.4 The practical relevance of dividend policy and the impact of dividends on 
share price 
Gordon (1962) takes the position that dividends are relevant to the market valuations. 
The literature on dividend policy identifies Gordon's work with the `traditional' view 
which states that dividend policy has incremental valuation effects on the market 
share prices. Gordon's (1962) growth model was developed based on Williams' 
(1938) findings and together the two valuation models demonstrate the relationship 
that exists between dividends and share valuation. Williams' (1938) and Gordon's 
(1962) models equate the market price of a share with the present value of expected 
future dividends growing at a constant rate. The valuation models predict that any 
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independent changes in the expectation of some future dividend would have an 
immediate effect on the market value of the company. 
It is believed that a company's flow of future dividends is likely to be a more 
complex pattern than the pattern assumed by Gordon (1962). In the simplified model, 
the future pattern of share's dividends grows at a constant annual rate, in perpetuity. 
The dividend growth model below confirms the relevance of dividends in the 
determination of market share price. The calculations below also show how Gordon's 
`dividend growth' model is derived. 
The dividend growth Model 
Key: 
do = current dividend per share (i. e. at time to - time now) 
d, = expected dividend per share in 12 months' time (i. e. t1 ) 
KE = cost of equity capital 
PE = ex div market price per share 
g= constant annual growth rate of dividends 
b= proportion of the year's earnings that are reinvested 
r= rate of return of reinvested earnings 
PE =d1/(1+KE)+ d1 (1 +J)/(1 +KE)2+ d1 (1 +9)2/(1 +KE)3 
........................ 
Cif (1 + g) N-1 / (1 + KE )N (I) 
multiplying each side by (1 + g) / (1 + KE ) gives, 
PE (1 +g)/(1 +KE) =dl(1 +g) /(1 +KE)2 + d1 (1 +g)2 /(1 +KE)3 
........................ 
d1 (1 + g) 
N/ (1 + KE )N+l (ii) 
subtracting equation (2) from equation (1) gives, 
PE -PE (1 +g)/(1 +KE)=d, /(1 +KE) - d1 (1 +g)N/(1 +KE)N+' (iii) 
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as long as KE >g then , as N approaches 
infinity so, d1 (1 + g) N/ (1 + KE )N+1 
approaches zero and therefore, 
PE - PE (1+g)/(1+KE) = dl/(1+KE) (iv) 
multiplying equation (iv), by (1 + KE ) gives, 
PE(1 +KE) - PE (1 +, g) = d1 (v) 
PE (KE - g) = d1 
Therefore: 
PE = di / (KE - g) or as PE = do (1 + g) / (KE - g) where: g= br (vi) 
From the above formulae we can derive the formula for cost of capital (KE ), therefore: 
KE _ (di / PE) +g or as KE =[ do (1 +g)/ PE l+9 (vii) 
The above cost of capital formula is also called Gordon's (1962) discounted cash flow 
model (DCF). Cost of capital is greatly utilized in finance when making investment 
appraisal decisions. The above discounted cash flow model does not necessarily 
establish a link between dividend decisions and investment decisions of an 
organization as investment does not figure in the equations. The past empirical 
research conducted by Drymes and Kurz (1967) appears to demonstrate that a 
relationship exists between dividends and investments, althought the time-series work 
of FAMA (1974) contradicts this. 
Dividend initiation announcements are associated with positive stock prices on 
average. For example, Asquith and Mullins (1983) reported abnormal returns of 3.7% 
around the announcement of dividend initiations, although similar findings persist in 
studies using longer and more recent sample periods, for example, Officer (2007). 
The higher share prices, along with the associated announcements of increases in 
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dividend payments, are typically interpreted as implying that dividend initiations (or 
increases) communicate valuable, positive information to the market. In the existing 
literature on dividend policy, two main hypotheses (that are not mutually exclusive) 
have emerged to explain the nature of this information (these are discussed later in 
this thesis, in sections 2.3.9 and 2.4.5 respectively): (i) that dividend initiations signal 
higher cash-flow/profitability for initiating firms; and (ii) that dividend initiations signal 
lower agency costs at the initiating firm as managers will have less of their 
shareholders' cash to waste, both now and in the future. Officer (2007) examined the 
relationship between share prices and dividend initiation, corporate governance and 
agency costs. He finds evidence consistent with the agency cost hypothesis that 
dividend initiations convey valuable information to investors about the reduction in 
agency costs for firms with weak pre-initiation governance. Officer's research findings 
also revealed that firms with characteristics that are thought to represent weak 
internal and external governance (insider dominated boards, managers entrenched 
by anti-takeover provisions, and low ownership by important external 
monitors) or weak monitoring, and high agency cost, experience significantly positive 
stock price reactions to dividend initiations announcements compared with firms with 
strong governance and monitoring. 
Officer's (2007) results suggest that firms with weak control systems (weak 
corporate governance) have to utilise dividend policy to substitute for their poor 
control systems. According to Officer's results the general market tends to see the 
firm's choice to initiate regular cash dividend payments as a sign of possessing robust 
monitoring systems and a reduction in agency costs. 
In the 2007 paper, Officer shows that dividends are relevant in influencing share 
price. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that dividend policy is a 
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substitute for other governance attributes and that the market prices respond to the 
reduction in agency costs resulting from the initiation of dividends. Robustness tests 
conducted by Officer suggest that the agency cost explanation for the relation 
between dividend initiation announcement and governance proxies is most consistent 
with the data used. 
In his 2007 paper, the dependent variable that Officer used is the sum of daily 
abnormal returns for dividend initiating firms for the 20-trading-day window beginning 
on day -22 (relative to the dividend initiation announcement date) and ending on day - 
2. The independend variables used include, for example, internal governance 
variables such as board size, strong board, CEO as chairman, board being insider 
dominated, % ownership by executive directors, % ownership by CEO, and external 
governance variables, including, for example, managerial entrenchment (BCF index , 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell's index), % ownership by institutions, % ownership by 
public pension funds; other variables include leverage, sales growth, market-to-book 
assets, cash flow from operations and many others. Officer used cross-sectional data 
and applied the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis accordingly. 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 below also demonstrate the relevance of dividend policy on 
financial matters. 
2.3.5 Different perspectives of dividend policy 
Merrill Lynch (1978) published a document, which stated that investors purchase 
stocks in order to: 
1. get income (dividends) 
2. get capital appreciation 
37 
3. get both 1 and 2. 
However, Pike (1984) suggested that investors generally preferred to buy shares to 
get appreciation than to earn income. On the other hand, Graham and Dodd (1951) 
believe that the market trend drifts towards higher dividends. Most dividend 
determination models possess a variable, which captures a reluctance of firms to 
reduce dividends, hence demonstrating the steady drift to larger dividends. 
Furthermore, the optimal control theory model for dividend determination presented 
by Davidson (1980) tends to lead towards determining increasing dividends. 
As good practice, before establishing a long term dividend policy for their 
organisations, company directors need to determine the key forces driving their 
shareholders to purchase shares. 
2.3.6 Wealth transfers between shareholders and bondholders 
In the literature on option theory it is suggested that `wealth transfer' occurs when 
dividends are paid to shareholders. Dividends increase the wealth of shareholders at 
the expense of bondholders by reducing the assets' base that provides security for 
the bondholders. In theory the `wealth transfer' is significant in geared organisations 
because paying dividends reduces the amount available for reinvesting back into the 
organisation in the future and hence decreases the future wealth generation and 
lowers the creditors' security. 
In practice bondholders tend to be protected by agreed contracts that enable 
bondholders to receive and enjoy all the benefits entitled to them. The bondholders' 
covenants restrict the dividend that can be paid out to shareholders enabling 
bondholders to get their share of the company's revenues. 
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Woolridge (1983) analysed the effects of unexpected dividend changes on values 
of common stock, preferred stock and bonds, and concluded that a wealth transfer 
effect is not necessarily ruled out, but if it exists it is dominated by the signalling 
effects. Furthermore, a study by Gombola and Liu (1999) does not support the notion 
of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders, but provides evidence supporting 
the signalling hypothesis. Therefore, the above empirical research does not support 
the hypothesis that when dividends are paid out to shareholders this results in a 
wealth transfer to shareholders and a reduction in the assets' base that provides 
security for bondholders. Current research on this subject matter has been centred on 
investigating the types of situation where relationships of wealth transfers can take 
place and the type of bond covenant restrictions that would be needed to overcome 
unfair practice. 
2.3.7 The effects of information availability on dividends - the signalling 
hypothesis 
Financial announcements, such as dividends declarations, inform investors and other 
stakeholders of the organisation on the future prospects of the firm. Good 
management signals its abilities by paying higher dividends than less able 
management. Paying higher dividends sends a signal to the stakeholders that the 
company is in `good hands'. However, Borokhovich et al's (2005) work shows that the 
signalling hypothesis has disappointing results when it is tested empirically. 
Borokhovich et al (2005) concluded that paying dividends reduces agency costs, 
but find no evidence to suggest that an increase in dividend payments reduces 
agency costs further. When dividends are paid out the lower agency costs imply that 
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managers of the organisation will have less of their shareholders' cash to waste both 
in the current and future periods. 
A high dividend might be a signal of underinvestment. However, Fama and French 
(1998) find that dividends have an impact on the share value. Further discussions of 
the signalling hypothesis are contained in Section 3.4.6. of this chapter. 
2.3.8 The implications of omitting dividends 
In the UK until the passing of the Trustee Act, 2000, the statutory powers and duties 
of trustees were largely defined in the 1961 Trustee Investment Act (1961, TIA), 
together with the Trustee Act, 1925. Under the 1961 Trustee Investments Act, a public 
company in the UK that failed to pay a dividend in any of the previous five years was 
not entitled to a wider range status. This means that the 1961 Act had, for example, 
restricted the use of trust funds in being invested in companies that had no dividend 
record in any of the five year period. Another restriction of the 1961 Act was that the 
trust fund had to be split into two parts comprising narrow and wide-range 
investments, in a maximum 25%/75% split. Due to the (1961, TIA) restrictions 
mentioned above, instead of paying a zero dividend most public companies were at 
least paying a minimal amount. 
The Law Commission in 1999 highlighted the above mentioned problems that were 
contained in the (1961, TIA) and made recommendations for change which involved 
removal of some of the restrictions. The restrictions were removed accordingly by the 
2000 Act, which introduced a new power of investment to replace that contained in 
the 1961 Act. The 2000 Act gives much wider investment powers to trustees, 
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including trustees of pension funds. Trustees may now make any kind of investment 
with the exception of certain types of land. The general power of investment 
contained in section 3 of the 2000 Act enables trustees to invest in anything that they 
could have invested in if they were the absolute owner of the funds. It is now possible, 
for example, for trustees to invest in companies that have very poor dividend records 
and newly privatised utilities, which would not have conformed to the requirements of 
the 1961 Act, and there is no longer any requirement to divide the fund into equities 
and gilts. In addition to the general statutory power, there may be express powers of 
investment given to the trustees in the Trust Instrument itself. 
However, the 2000 Act does state that it is necessary for trustees to review, on a 
regular basis, the investment decisions which they make and to obtain appropriate 
advice before making a particular form of investment. Therefore, perhaps due to the 
duty of care that is expected from the trustees, the trustees might select not to invest 
in companies that omit dividends. 
The 2000 Act does not specify the regularity with which investments should be 
reviewed, but it has been suggested by Martyn Frost, a Manager with Barclays Bank 
Trust Company, that such review should be at least annually (Frost, 2001). Due to the 
above mentioned, regular recommended inspections are laid out that by the 2000 Act, 
so that trustees may pull out of companies that are omitting dividends. Thus, the 
Trustee Act 2000 implicitly has implications for omitting dividends. 
2.3.9 Relationship between dividends and share buy-backs 
Mitchell and Robinson (1999) stated that the bulk of prior research on share buy- 
backs has been undertaken within the US legislative environment. They observed 
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that the perceptions of buy-backs in Australia are different to the US, and Mitchell and 
Robinson (1999) concluded that the motivations for on-market buy-backs are: (a) 
signalling of future expectations (underpricing), and (b) an attempt to increase 
financial performance, earnings per share (EPS) and/or enhance share position. For 
selective buy-backs, the main purpose is to remove specific shareholders from the 
share register. Employee buy-backs are generally seen as an off-market means of 
providing a market for the company's shares. Finally, the overriding motivation for 
buy-backs is as an alternative to dividends. The above shows that there are potential 
advantages to companies of following a share buyback policy. 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) found that share repurchases are negatively related 
to previous stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing 
depending on the degree of perceived future undervaluation of shares. In addition, 
repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with 
liquidity arguments. Share buy backs occur in organisations that are substantially 
liquid. 
Grullon and Michaely ( 2002) show that share repurchases have not only become 
an important form of payout for US corporations, but also for firms that finance their 
share repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase 
dividends. According to Grullon and Michaely ( 2002) young US firms have a higher 
propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in the past, and 
repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) found that the large established US firms have a higher tendency to 
pay out cash through repurchases and generally the large firms have also not cut 
their dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggested that their findings mentioned 
above indicate that firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends. Before 
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1983, the regulatory constraints in the USA inhibited firms from aggressively 
repurchasing shares according to Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) confirm that, for decades in the USA, corporations 
have preferred to pay out cash in the form of dividends rather than share 
repurchases, despite the relative tax advantage of capital gains over ordinary income. 
The advantages of capital gains tax and other relevant matters regarding taxation and 
dividends are discussed in section 2.4.3 of this thesis. 
Over the past twenty years share repurchase has experienced significant growth. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) disclose the following relevant statistics, which are 
related to US firms: 
" expenditures on share repurchase programmes by 2000 were 8.7 times the 
expenditures in 1980; 
" share repurchase expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 26.1 per 
cent over the period 1980 to 2000, while dividends only grew at an average 
annual rate of 6.8 per cent; and 
" share repurchases as a percentage of total dividends increased from 13.1 per 
cent in 1980 to 113.1 per cent in 2000. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) also reveal that, in 1999 and 2000, US corporations 
spent more money on shares repurchases than on dividend payments, and this was 
for the first time in history when share repurchases have been more popular than 
dividends. 
The information given above has clearly answered the three questions given below 
that Grullon and Michaely (2002) wanted to answer when they conducted their study 
on US firms: 
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" question one: what are the reasons for this change in corporate payout policy? 
" question two: are corporates buying back shares with funds that they would 
otherwise have used to pay divideds? 
" question three: why did the process not start much earlier? 
2.4 Which factors influence dividend policy? 
The objective of this section is to identify the factors that influence the dividend policy 
decisions of a firm. 
Dalton and Pointon (1997) confirm that numerous past research studies have 
identified the factors that influence corporate dividend policy decision, details of which 
are given below. There is no dominant factor that can be identified as establishing 
corporate dividend policy. Different factors tend to influence dividend policy decisions 
dominantly at different times. 
Kania and Bacon (2005) confirmed that various factors, that are identified in 
dividend theory literature, work together to influence the dividend policy of companies. 
Some of the key factors that influence dividends are mentioned below. 
2.4.1 Stability of dividends 
In the UK, Rutterford, (1994) and Gill and Green (1993), and in the US Lintner (1956) 
have suggested that management tend to prefer stable dividends and avoid risking an 
increase in dividends, that may have to be reduced in the future. 
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Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) suggested that many managers of Nasdaq firms 
make dividend decisions consistent with Lintner's (1956) survey results and model. 
Baker, Veit and Powell's (2001) results also showed significant differences between 
the manager responses of financial and non-financial firms on nine of their 22 factors. 
This finding is implied to suggest that the presence of industry effects on dividend 
policy decisions causes the non-financial firms to have some different factors to 
financial firms. Additionally, the same factors that influence dividends in Nasdaq firms 
are generally also important to NYSE firms (see Baker, Veit and Powell; 2001). 
2.4.2 Dividend payout ratio 
Adedeji (1998) found a positive relationship between dividend payout ratios and debt 
financing in the UK. This was mainly because firms with larger proportions of debt 
financing are more financially risky, and so shareholders should demand a greater 
return on the shares, leading to a pressure to increase dividends. 
2.4.3 Effects of taxation on dividend policy decisions 
When the assumption made by Miller and Modigliani (1961) of a perfect tax free 
environment is relaxed, the dividend irrelevance proposition is questionable. The 
effects of taxation on dividend policy are mixed and the literature below regarding this 
issue is disjointed. More work is required to be carried out by researchers to enable 
us to see a clearer pattern of the effects on tax on dividend policy. 
Most countries treat the taxation of dividends and capital gains differently. For 
example, in 1995 according to Price Waterhouse worldwide survey, long-term capital 
gains were exempt from taxation in Germany and in Japan only 55% of the long-term 
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capital gains were taxable. In the UK and Australia the acquisition costs are index- 
linked so that only the real gains are taxable. In the UK and other countries even 
though capital gains are taxed at income tax rates, exemption levels tend to reduce 
the effective tax rates on chargeable gains. Some countries separate corporation tax 
from income tax under a classical tax system, whilst others allow for some of the 
corporation tax to be imputed (deemed paid) by the shareholders (see Table 2.4.3). 
Table 2.4.3 A classification of tax systems 
" USA 
Classical tax systems " Japan 
UK 
Imputation tax systems " Germany 
" France 
" Australia 
It would seem beneficial for a US firm, for example, to retain profits within the 
corporation rather than to issue dividends, thus avoiding the double taxation under a 
classical system. 
Dai (2007) showed that the results of the relationship between the dividend payout 
levels and investor's tax rates on dividends are mixed. Therefore different companies 
and investors respond to tax rates differently. Auerbach (1979), Miller and Scholes 
(1978), Feldstein and Green (1983) and Allen and Michaely (2002) all suggest that 
investors in high tax brackets still buy stocks that pay substantial amounts of 
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dividends. By paying out dividends, Feldstein and Green (1983) observe that some 
US corporations are voluntarily inflicting a high tax liability on their shareholders. 
Poterba (2004) investigates the influence of tax reforms on variation in dividend 
payouts over time. He finds in the US that dividend payouts are affected by the 
dividend tax rate, implying that corporate payout policy does respond to changes in 
tax regulations, consistent with the prediction of the tax clientele theory. 
Dai (2007) has shown that firms pay out more dividends, when the relative tax rate 
on dividends goes down. He suggests that the tax effect is also associated with the 
firm's ownership structure, as the firm's dividend policy will only reflect changes in tax 
code, when tax brackets of its major owners have been affected (Dai, 2007). 
Crossland, Dempsey and Moizer (1991) have supported the existence in the UK of 
tax-induced shareholder-clienteles, who for tax reasons avoid some shares, but are 
attracted to others. However, earlier Black (1976) argued that if any particular 
stockholder avoided stocks for tax reasons that certain investor would not be able to 
construct a well-diversified portfolio. 
Nam, Wang and Zhang (2004) examined the effect of managerial stock holdings on 
corporate dividend payments under a new dividend tax environment. Utilizing a very 
rare event of the cut in dividend tax rates introduced in May 2003, Nam et al (2004) 
investigated whether managers holding sizable stakes direct their corporations to 
raise dividends for their own benefits. Nam et al's (2004) results showed that 
managerial stock holdings have a significantly positive effect on both the likelihood 
and the extent of a dividend increase in the year 2003. However, their results 
suggested that there was no such relationship for the period of 1993 through to 2002 
(the period before the dividend tax cuts). 
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Elton and Gruber (1970) , Poterba 
(2004) and Dai (2007), managed to 
demonstrate that dividends are relevant to the pricing of shares. Elton and Gruber's 
(1970) results suggested that tax rates decrease as the dividend yield (dividend per 
share / share price) ctreases and this had effect on the share price. 
However on the other hand, in the UK Menyah (1993) did not find evidence to 
support the existence of a tax-induced dividend in affecting the pricing of shares, in 
his study of the ex-dividend pricing of shares from 1955 to 1984. Chuff, Strong and 
Cadle (1992) discovered for 1955 to 1983 that, when certain companies which 
suffered from increased corporate tax exhaustion were excluded, the hypothesis that 
tax coefficients were the same across three different tax regimes was rejected. This 
finding suggests that in some situations the impact of certain tax systems has 
significant influences on share pricing. 
With regards to taxation, Auerbach (1979) argues that retention is in effect a 
deferred dividend, and so the market should capitalise not only the retention but also 
the taxes payable on distribution. This means that to a 30% taxpayer, the retention of 
$1 is worth only 70 cents when it is paid in the future as a dividend. The $1 retention 
should be viewed by the investor as increasing the market value of the firm by only 70 
cents. Auerbach (1979) refers to this reasoning as `the capitalisation view', on the 
basis that the tax effects are capitalised in market prices. Auerbach `s (1979) 
`capitalisation view', is regarded as consistent with the dividend irrelevance position. 
2.4.4 Earnings' retention ratio 
The study carried out by Adedeji (1998) on UK firms suggests that the earnings' 
retentions of a firm tend to be used to finance investments. Adedeji's (1998) 
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suggestions seem to be consistent with the residual theory of dividends which states 
that dividends should only be paid when the firm has financed all its positive net 
present value projects. Therefore, if there are no worthwhile investments dividends 
are increased and low growth companies tend to pay high dividends, while high 
growth companies tend to pay low dividends. Thus, according to Adedeji (1998), 
dividend payout ratios are negatively associated with capital investment in the UK. 
Now, Myers' pecking order theory states that firms initially prefer to finance 
investment from retained funds, secondly if funds are inadequate, debt finance is 
considered and, finally, as a last resort external equity finance from the issue of 
shares is considered. Thus, Myers (1998)'s pecking order theory is consistent with 
the findings attained by Adedeji (1998). 
2.4.5 Agency Costs 
The agency cost is incurred by an organisation when there are problems such as: 
" divergent management-shareholder objectives and 
" information asymmetry between shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
firm. 
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling carried out a study which showed that directors assure 
shareholders that they are managing corporate affairs in their best interest through 
dividend payments. The payments of cash are regarded as reducing the availability of 
cash for non-essential activities and hence reducing agency costs indirectly. 
In their research study Jensen and Meckling (1976) integrated elements from the 
agency aspects of the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop 
their theory of the ownership structure of the firm. In their study Jensen and Meckling 
divided agency costs into three groups as follows: 
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" the monitoring costs by the principal, 
" the economic bonding costs by the agent, and 
" the residual economic loss. 
Monitoring costs include audit fees, for example, and are necessarily incurred to 
monitor the behaviour of the managers, who should be making decisions on their 
behalf. Monitoring costs can be transferred to the agent by adjusting the remuneration 
package of the agent-manager (Godfrey et al, 1992). 'Economic bonding costs include 
accounts preparation, which are incurred by the company but the burden is passed 
on to the directors through remuneration adjustments (Godfrey et al, 1992). 
Nevertheless, the monitoring and economic bonding costs help determine a 
congruence of interests between principal and agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
urgue that they are an unavoidable result of the agency relationship, and so the 
above two cost categories are not `wasted', but deemed necessary. However, by 
contrast, residual economic loss refers to agent-managers' wasting money, which 
benefit the agent but not the principal, of which an example is expenditure on 
unnecessary perquisites. Residual economic loss therefore equals the total agency 
costs less the sum of the monitoring and economic bonding costs. Dividends reduce 
residual economic loss because there is less free cash flow, and hence less available 
to waste on self indulgent and reckless expenditure. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also concluded that the level of agency costs depend 
among other things on statutory and common law and human creativity in devising 
better contracts. Both the law and the sophistication of contracts relevant to the 
modern corporations are the incentives by different company stakeholders to try and 
minimise agency costs. 
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Easterbrook (1984) suggested that firms that pay dividends at particularly 
favourable levels, that enable the firm to raise external finance, result in the 
management of the firm reducing its agency costs and transmitting new financial 
information to investors. Easterbrook (1984)'s suggestions are consistent with 
empirical evidence presented by Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995). According to 
Rozeff (1982), firms that have lower dividend payout ratios have been found to have 
fewer insiders holding shares. Schooley and Barney (1994) found that, when the 
levels of shares that are owned by management are above 15 per cent, the dividend 
yield increases with ownership, hence higher dividend payments result. However, 
when the level of shares owned by management are less than 15 per cent, the 
dividend yield falls as ownership increases, hence a lower dividend payment. 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) concluded that for firms that omitted dividend 
payments the impact on the share price was much less for Japanese firms than for 
US corporations. They argued that the relationship-network between agents and 
investors in Japan was much closer and so Japan had lower agency costs. 
2.4.6 Signalling 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), in the world of uncertainly, there is a role 
for determining dividends as a signalling tool, conveying information from the 
directors of a company to its shareholders. Therefore deviations from established 
target payout ratios may be interpreted as a change in the future earnings anticipated 
by the management of the company. Also any other financial announcements, such 
as dividends declarations, inform investors and other stakeholders of the organisation 
about the future prospects of the firm. According to the signalling hypothesis, good 
management signals its management abilities by paying higher dividends than less 
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able managers. Paying higher dividends sends a signal to the stakeholders that the 
company is in `good hands'. However, Borokhovich et al's (2005) work shows that the 
signalling hypothesis has disappointing results when it is tested empirically. 
Borokhovich et al (2005) concluded that paying some, rather than no, dividends 
reduces agency costs, but find no evidence to suggest that a further increase in 
dividend payments reduces agency costs further. When dividends are paid out the 
lower agency costs imply that managers of the organisation will have less of their 
shareholders' cash to waste both in the current and future periods. 
A study by Edwards, Mayer, Pasherdes and Poterba (1985) is consistent with the 
view that the adjustments in dividends signal the expected future earnings in UK 
firms. In the USA, Olson and McCann (1994) found that firms that followed a 
signalling dividend policy tended to have a higher growth of assets turnover but had 
lower growth of revenues. Olson and McCann (1994) found that the revenues of the 
signalling firms were most variable. The behaviour of the dividends' ability to signal 
future profitability was found by Asquith and Mullins (1983), in organisations that paid 
their first dividends or resumed dividend payments after a break of at least ten years, 
and excess returns were discovered in firms mentioned above. 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) concluded in their study that firms that 
increase their dividends are less likely to find that their future earnings are reduced. 
Lintner (1956) seemed to imply from his interviews that earnings signal dividends and 
that partial adjustemts may be made in future years, earnings permitting. However, 
Davidson (2002) mentions that there is a widespread belief that a change in 
behaviour of dividends signals the future profitability the least when compared with a 
change in other variables. 
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As mentioned above one of the most important predictions of the dividend- 
signalling hypothesis is that dividend changes are positively correlated with future 
changes in profitability and earnings. Contrary to this prediction, Grullon, Michaely, 
Benartzi and Thaler (2005) show that, after controlling for the well documented non- 
linear patterns in the behaviour of earnings, dividend changes contain no information 
about future earnings' changes. Grulion, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) show 
that dividend changes are negatively correlated with future changes in profitability 
(return on assets). Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) investigated 
whether including dividend changes improves earnings' forecasts. They found that 
models that include dividend changes do not outperform those that do not include 
dividend changes. 
2.4.7 Growth 
Rutterford (1994) points out that generally managers believe that a steady growth 
trend in dividends is important for shareholders. However, Black and Scholes (1974) 
state that it is difficult to test whether expected returns, which comprise dividends and 
capital gains, are affected by dividend policy. 
2.4.8 Financial risk 
According to Chang and Rhee (1990), shareholders in more highly geared firms may 
demand higher dividends as a compensation for the level of financial risk. 
Additionally, Black (1976) confirms that increased dividends result in a reduction in 
funds available to creditors, which in extreme cases could affect credit terms of the 
company. 
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2.4.9 Takeovers 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakaiotos (1998) investigated the relationship between a 
company's dividend strategy and its risk of takeover. Their results from a large panel 
of UK quoted companies suggested that higher dividend payments are associated 
with a significantly lower conditional probability (hazard) of takeover. Dickerson, 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1998) state that firms that wish to avoid takeover would be 
better to distribute the marginal unit of earnings in dividends rather than investing it in 
the company. They suggested that the presence of an active market for corporate 
control could encourage firms to raise dividends to maintain shareholder loyalty. 
2.4.10 Capital investment needs 
Bond and Meghir (1994) found that capital investment needs are likely to put 
restraints on dividends. They established that `cheaper' internal funds are preferred in 
the financing of capital investments to borrowings and external shares. Bond and 
Meghir (1994) reached their conclusion after conducting a study on 626 large UK 
firms, from 1971 - 1986. 
2.4.11 Transaction costs and issue costs 
Dalton and Pointon (1997) mentions that capital markets are not frictionless, for when 
investors sell shares they can incur transaction costs. When firms reduce dividends 
and investors want to sell part of their holdings to rectify deficiencies in income (Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961), transaction costs are incured by investors. The transaction 
costs involved in selling the shares tend to limit such activities. However, transaction 
costs mentioned above are avoidable. 
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Buckland and Davis (1989) found that firms which pay dividends at high levels 
such that the firm ends up with insufficient retentions to meet capital investment 
requirements tend to seek external financing through the capital markets, although 
this is associated with issue costs. The issue costs incurred at the corporate level by 
the firm issuing shares are unavoidable when the firm is raising external finance. 
Davidson (1986) conducted a study on dividend policy in imperfect markets 
particularly analysing the impact of transaction costs, taxation and issue costs on 
dividend policy. Davidson (1986) complies with Prisman's (1986) suggestions of 
considering the `valuation operators' as being derived by the individual's position in 
the imperfect market (specifically, the individual's position in the lifecycle with 
exogenously determined personal tax rates). In his1986 study Davidson incorporated 
transaction costs and taxation into the simple lifecycle valuation model (the lifecycle 
model was adopted because the conventional valuation models of market equilibrium 
fail to incorporate market imperfections in a satisfactory manner). The imperfections 
point to investors' valuations as being a function of dividend policy, suggesting that 
certain dividend policies might lead to beneficial arbitrage opportunities. Although a 
given dividend policy cannot be value maximising for all investors, certain dividend 
polices tend to minimise the trading reaction on announcement. The equilibrium 
implications of dividend policies are argued as follows: each individual investor is 
assumed to have an optimum effective rate of return, which depends on a range of 
factors, such as the individual's wealth, tax rates, age etc.. For the purposes of 
Davidson's study it was assumed that only two factors affected an individual's 
optimum rate of return, which are tax rates and the individual's position in the lifecycle 
(captured by a simple saving-dissaving dichotomy). If there is a dividend level that 
leads to all individual investors valuing the firm identically, then this is termed in 
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Davidson's thesis (1986) a'strong equilibrium dividend policy', which he 
acknowledges to be similar in definition to that of Prisman. A strong equilibrium 
dividend policy results in a non-abnormal trading activity both on announcements of 
dividends and afterwards. Davidson states that management regard strong 
equilibrium dividend policies as advantageous. On the other hand, if there is a 
dividend level that results in all individuals valuing their firms differently, this would be 
termed a `weak equilibrium dividend policy'. The different valuations resulting under 
the `weak equilibrium dividend policy' would be of a very small amount that is not 
sufficient to induce immediate trading because of transaction costs. 
The following are the results that Davidson (1986) found when transactions costs 
were introduced in the lifecycle valuation model. The transactions costs were found to 
flatten the time path of the portfolio value, denoted w(t), and reduce lifetime 
transactions costs. Davidson also states that: 
" for an individual who is divesting or disposing, the preference for dividends is 
high. The implication is that clienteles should go for high or low dividend 
paying stocks, with the maximum return to a saver and the opposite to a dis- 
saver; and 
" the preferences of a third clientele holding some securities, which are in a 
non-changing phase (whose holders are neither investing or divesting) are 
likely to be a weak. 
0 The fourth group of clienteles consists of individuals, who are presently bound 
by the strong rationing constraint such that they do not currently hold shares. 
These clienteles would only be induced to move off this constraint in the short 
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term period if there was a possibility of an abnormally high return, for example, 
if there were a Trustee Savings Bank flotation. 
When taxation under an imputation system (such as the one in the UK) is 
incorporated in the lifecycle valuation model together with transactions, similar results 
as those mentioned above were found. When taxation under a classical system (such 
as the tax system in the USA) is incorporated in the lifecycle model together with 
transaction costs, the following results are found: 
" for a saving clientele to prefer dividends to retentions, the individual's average 
or marginal tax rates are less than capital gains tax rate less the transaction 
cost rate. For example, as given by Davidson (1986), if the effective capital 
gains tax rate is 20% and transaction cost rate is 4%, then the investor's 
marginal income tax or average tax rates should be less than 17% for high 
dividends to be preferred. 
" for a dissaving clientele, dividends are preferred by investors, when the 
individual's average or marginal tax rates are less than the capital gains tax 
rate and the transaction cost rate. Considering the example above, dividends 
are preferred only if the investor's marginal rate is less than 23%. A dissaving 
tax-exempt institution would have a preference for dividends, only if the 
dividends were not reinvested. On the other hand, in the case of individuals a 
high level of transaction costs would be required to induce a preference for 
dividends over retentions. 
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2.4.12 Liquidity 
Theobald (1978) suggests that excessive dividends in the UK could be a reflection of 
inflationary effects and the influence of historic cost profits. Consequently, Lawson 
and Stark (1981) suggested that in the UK dividend payments have been excessive in 
relation to cash flows. To counter-act this problem, as observed by Dalton and 
Pointon (1997), dividend cuts tend to reflect low liquidity. Later, Kania and Bacon 
(2005) have suggested not surprisingly that increasing dividends reduced liquidity. 
2.4.13 Cultural effects 
Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and Collins and Sekely (1983) suggest that a significant 
determinant of the capital structure of firms with headquarters in different countries 
tends to be according to the particular country, in which the headquarters are located. 
Collins and Sekely (1988) conclude that one explanation for the above statement is 
that there tend to be different cultural factors that influence corporate capital structure. 
The key to this was later unlocked by Coates, Davis, Reeves and Zafar (1995), 
Buckland (1989) and Van Ees and Garretsen (1994), who concluded that the 
countries that are identified as possessing a security based culture tend to be more 
sensitive to stock-market changes than those that tend to be bank oriented and this is 
one of the primary reasons for inter-country differences in dividend policy. They 
classified the UK, France and the USA as security based systems and Germany as a 
bank oriented system, whilst Japan was identified as possessing characteristics of 
both systems. Coates et al (1995) confirmed that, in Germany, banks play a 
significant role in the provision of debt to German firms. German banks have a 
tendency of having far loser relationships with corporate clients than those in UK and 
USA organisations. Consistent with this, Dalton and Pointon (1997) mention that 
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since German firms have a propensity to improve liquidity by approaching their banks 
it would seem as if liquidity and gearing would not be critically important in 
determining corporate dividend policy in Germany. Also as far as the UK and 
Germany are concerned, Mayer (1994) points out that the UK firms' dividend policies 
tend to be non-flexible, but German firms regularly cut and waive dividends 
frequently. The cultural acceptance of this makes sense within the German 
environment, which has such a significant role played by the banking sector. 
In contrast to the German case, Coates et al (1995) state that the UK, France and 
the USA all have strong and influential stock markets, and that the capital markets 
tend to be sensitive to changes in dividends. As dividends have a potential impact on 
share prices, this helps to explain the reluctance of UK and USA firms to cut 
dividends. 
In the UK and the USA, firms are identified by Dalton and Pointon (1997) as having 
diverse ownership and relative autonomy of managers, resulting in the existence of 
asymmetric information between shareholders and management. The existence of 
asymmetric information leads to dividends being regarded as a signalling device, 
monitoring management performance of the organisation. Dalton and Pointon (1997) 
mention that it would seem as if, in the UK and the USA, signalling and growth have 
a tendency to be important factors that determine dividend policy, while liquidity and 
capital investment factors are likely to have less influence on dividend policy. The 
study by Dalton and Pointon (1997) gives results that are consistent with a number of 
researchers mentioned in section 2.4.6 of this thesis, particularly consistent with the 
study conducted by Edwards, Mayer, Pasherdes and Poterba (1985), which reflects 
the view that the adjustments in dividends signal the expected future earnings in UK 
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firms. However, the signalling behaviour of dividends has been regarded in the 
relevant literature as giving very poor results particularly; Borokhovich et al's (2005) 
work discussed in section 2.4.6 of this thesis shows that the signalling hypothesis has 
disappointing results when it is tested empirically, exposing the weaknesses of the 
signalling hypothesis of dividends. 
In Japan, Allen (1992) observed that Japanese companies tend to follow the 
practice of paying dividends at a constant percentage of par-value, which is usually 
10%. It follows that he goes on to suggest that dividends do not act as a signalling 
device in Japan. By way of explanation, he points out that, in Japan, there exists a 
system of cross-shareholdings called `mochiai', and this system results in close 
relationships existing between group companies. The close relationships between 
companies mean that direct information can easily flow between company 
management and some shareholders. Additionally, Allen (1992) states that a large 
proportion of external finance is provided by banks, whose funding tends to consist of 
short-term borrowing, because Japanese government security market regulations 
have restrictions on both the supply and demand of corporate debt. But what does 
determine dividends in Japan? Meric et al (2002) found that dividend policies in 
Japanese insurance firms and other financial organisations tend to be influenced by 
financial leverage, profitability and business risk indicators. 
From Dalton and Pointon's study (1997) it would seem that the stability of 
dividends would be generally the common factor that influences dividend policy 
significantly in all the countries mentioned below: 
" Australia 
" France 
9 Germany 
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" Japan 
" United Kingdom, and 
" United States of America. 
Dalton and Pointon (1997) suggested that the capital investment needs and liquidity 
needs of the organisation are of minimal importance in influencing dividend policies of 
European countries. However, the capital investment needs and liquidity needs of the 
organisation are in some cases very significant in influencing dividend policies in 
USA, Australia and Japan. Dalton and Pointon (1997) and Sekely and Collins (1988) 
call researchers to investigate the impact of different legal structures, cultures, and 
social differences in influencing divided policy in different countries. 
According to Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) most emerging markets have a bank 
centred financial system and contractual agreements are not normally at arm's length. 
Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) suggest that firms in the emerging markets have 
more unstable dividend payments than their USA counterparts. The regression 
analysis results of the study conducted by Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) on 
emerging markets' organisations indicate that dividends are much less sensitive to 
past dividends and these findings support the view that the capital markets in 
developing countries make dividends a less viable mechanism for signalling and for 
reducing agency costs than for their USA counterparts, operating in more highly 
developed arm's length capital markets. 
Finally, Maury and Pajuste (2002) concluded that in Finland the control structure 
affects the dividend policy in Finnish listed organisations. In particular, when the chief 
executive officer is a large shareholder the firms tend to pay lower dividends. Maury 
61 
and Pajuste (2002) suggested that dominant shareholders in control may plan 
generating private benefits associated with control, that are not shared with minority 
shareholders as indicated by lower divided payout levels. 
2.5 Dividend policy guidelines for banks 
Dickens, Casey and Newman (2002) compared the factors that influence dividend 
policy in industrial firms and US banking corporations. They proposed that the 
dividend discount model holds, i. e. a stock's price is affected by the value of its future 
dividends. Therefore, if dividends impact firm value, then the factors determining 
those dividends deserve investigation for particular companies and industries. 
Dickens, Casey and Newman (2002) also appreciated that in the past other 
researchers, such as Fama and French (1998), find empirical support for the 
relationship between share price and dividends. Dickens, Casey and Newman's 
(2002) work utilises the theory that states that dividends can signal management's 
view of a firm's financial condition (Bhattacharya, 1979 and Miller and Rock, 1985), 
although Borokhovich et al's (2005) work shows that the signalling hypothesis has 
generally disappointing results. 
Past research, carried out by Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995), utilised industrial 
firms, but excluded banking firms. But, Dickens et al (2002) adapted Barclay et al's 
(2005) study to make it suitable for banking firms. Dickens et al (2002) found that 
studying the dividend policy for banking corporations is interesting and important, 
given the banks' managerial differences relative to industrial firms as well as the 
banks' vital economic role, and from a practical standpoint many banks pay significant 
dividends. 
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Dickens et al (2002) produced two hypothesised dividend models, using firstly key 
variables chosen from the extensive dividend policy literature, and secondly adapting 
it for banks, namely: 
Dividend Yield =f [Market-to-Book(-), Regulation Dummy(+), Log of Revenue(+), 
Future Earnings(+)] (D C&N Model One) 
and 
Dividend Yield = f[Market-to-Book(-), Capital-to-Assets(+), Log of Revenue(+), 
Future Earnings(+), Inside Ownership(-), Previous Dividend(+), Earnings 
Volatility()] (D C&N Model Two) 
The mathematical signs in the equations show the expected relationship of each 
independent variable to dividend yield. 
The following is the published literature particularly on agency theory that Dickens 
et al (2002) utilised in their research. Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) both 
propose agency cost models for dividend determination which Dickens et al (2002) 
found useful. Rozeff (1982) does not examine industry differences, but does exclude 
three industries due to regulation (depository institutions, transportation, and 
insurance) and one industry (petroleum) because of its peculiar accounting 
procedures. Studies examining industry differences are consistent with Rozeff's 
(1982) model in general, but only for certain variables. Casey and Theis (1997) study 
the petroleum industry and find support for dividend policy to be related to agency 
problems and risk, but not investment opportunities or size. Barclay, Smith, and Watts 
(1995) and Noronha, Shome, and Morgan (1996) consider the agency model at a 
more general level by including an interaction term with the firm's capital structure. 
Chen and Steiner (1999) provide an example of the generalised model. Other 
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researchers such as Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) and Dempsey and Laber 
(1992) find support for the agency cost dividend model over time and across industry 
segments, and an industry relationship effect appears in Michel (1979), Dempsey, 
Laber, and Rozeff (1993), and Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995). Casey and Dickens 
(2000) study banks and find support for investment opportunities and agency 
problems as determinants for dividend policy, but not risk or size. 
Dickens et al's (2002) data sources were the Morningstar's Principia Pro July CDs 
for 1999 and 2000. Dickens et al (2002) identified from the July CDs firms by industry 
using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and eliminating those not 
incorporated in the U. S. and those firms with missing data. 
Firstly in DC&N model one, Dickens et al (2002) screened the data to obtain 
4,112 industrial firm observations over the three-year period to confirm the regression 
results of Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) who used a different data source and also 
who examined a different period. Dickens et al (2002) used Tobit regression, as did 
Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995), to estimate the coefficients because 51 percent of 
the firms had a dividend yield of zero; a value of 25 percent justifies Tobit's usage. 
Secondly in DC&N model two, Dickens et al (2002) identified and selected 677 
banking firm observations for inspection within their adaptation of the Barclay, Smith, 
and Watts (1995) model. The model Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) used included 
investment opportunities, regulation, size, and signalling factors to explain industrial 
firms' dividend policy. Dickens et al (2002) initially accounted for agency conflicts. 
Dickens et al (2002) accepted that the theory holds that inside ownership reduces the 
agency problem, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe. Insiders have less need 
for dividends, as their ownership encourages efficient management. In addition, 
insiders also could receive compensation through perks and / or other non-dividend 
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payment forms. On the other hand, a firm operated by managers without ownership 
interest may pay higher dividends for two reasons. Firstly, the managers may be 
encouraged to act together with owners' desires if feeling pressure to maintain and 
improve the dividend payout. Second, the non-owner managers can use dividends as 
a device to signal the firm's value (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985). In 
keeping with Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995), Dickens et al's (2002) used the per 
cent of stock owned by employees or directors as their measure of the agency 
problem and denoted this measure as inside ownership. Based on the discussion 
above and the empirical results in Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995), Dickens et al 
(2002) expected inside ownership to have a negative relationship to dividend yield. 
Dickens et al (2002) next added a variable to account for dividend history based on 
the classic Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) articles. Fama and Babiak 
reported that many firms simply opt for a stable dividend policy and base current 
dividends on the previous year's dividend. The measure they employed was the 
previous year's dividend per share divided by the previous year's stock price and they 
denoted it as the previous dividend. In keeping with Fama and Babiak's findings, they 
expected dividend yield to have a positive relationship to previous dividend. Finally, 
Dickens et al (2002) added a risk factor to the Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) 
model. Although Dickens et al's (2002) regulation variable, capital-to-assets, may 
capture some risk, they believed earnings volatility would improve their ability to 
identify risk. For support for this variable, they turned to Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey 
(1995) who presented evidence that firms with unstable earnings pay fewer 
dividends. Dickens et al (2002) expected earnings volatility to have a negative 
relationship with dividend yield. Dickens et al (2002) used Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Regression in the estimation of the equation above because only eight per cent of the 
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banking firms had zero dividend yields. This amount was well below the 25 per cent 
cutoff required to justify the Tobit estimation process. 
Thus, Dickens et al (2002) found that for model one the results using the Tobit 
regression analysis for the 4,112 industrial firm observations from 1998-2000 data 
were consistent with the results found by Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995), who also 
investigated industrial firms. Both studies on industrial firms found that dividend yield 
(dividend policy) was related to the firm's investment opportunities negatively, which 
was indicated by the market-to-book value, which had a negative relationship with 
dividend yield. Both results showed that regulated firms made regular dividend 
payments, which was shown by the positive association of a regulation dummy with 
dividend yields. Results revealed that higher revenue firms would have lower 
bankruptcy probability, and therefore would pay higher dividends. This was shown by 
the positive relationship of log of revenue and dividend yield. The signalling factor in 
Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) was abnormal earnings. The positive relationship 
between future earnings and dividend yield shows that a higher current dividend may 
signal greater expected future earnings. However, Borokhovich et al (2005), 
mentioned in section 2.4.6 of this thesis, state that the signalling hypothesis of 
dividend policy has disappointing results in signalling future earnings. 
Dickens et al (2002) reported that their results for equation two above, which was 
applied to 677 banking firm-observations from 1998-2000, were similar to those for 
equation one, using Tobit output. The coefficients for the three variables: 
" market-to-book (showing low investment opportunities being related to 
dividend policy), 
" log of revenue ( showing lower bankruptcy probability being related to 
dividend policy) , and 
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0 future earnings (with higher current dividend signalling greater expected 
future earnings) , 
are consistent in sign and magnitude across both examinations. While the future 
earnings coefficient estimates are consistent, they are different from Moh'd, Perry, 
and Rimbey's (1995) results, who note that their findings seem to support the idea 
that firms with higher expected revenue growth tend to set lower dividends. This 
implied link between dividends and investment policies would mean lower 
dividends could be set to allow more internal financing (less external financing) of 
future growth opportunities. In general, the signs on all three variables support 
expectations that banking firms pay fewer dividends when more investment 
opportunities exist and pay more dividends the larger the firm. Thus, lower 
dividend yields seem to be signs of higher future earnings. 
The results found by Dickens et al (2002) show that some of the factors that influence 
dividend policy in industrial firms also apply to banking corporations. This shows that 
the factors that influence dividend policies across different industries possess some 
significant similarities. Therefore the literature discussed in section 2.3 and section 
2.4 of this thesis is relevant to banking corporations. 
Overall, Dickens et al's (2002) study identifies seven factors believed to influence 
bank dividend policy, and found empirical support for five of them. The five empirically 
supported factors are investment opportunities, size, agency problems, dividend 
history, and risk. The findings suggested the following guidelines for bank dividend 
policy: 
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Guideline 0: 
" This was developed because of the negative relationship between investment 
opportunities and dividend yield (dividend policy variable). 
Guideline 1: 
" This states that those banks with greater investment opportunities should 
conserve cash to fund those opportunities and, therefore, should pay fewer 
dividends. Dickens et al's (2002) results showed that banks with higher market 
- to - book values, and presumably greater investment opportunities, have 
lower dividend yields. 
Guideline 2: 
9 This was developed because of the positive relationship between the size of 
the bank and its dividend yield. 
Banks that are large in size are likely to pay higher dividends. Support for guideline 2 
comes from the findings showing banks with higher total revenues pay higher 
dividend yields. 
Guideline 3: 
" This was developed because of the negative relationship between insider 
ownership and dividend yield. 
Guideline 3 states that banks with fewer agency problems can pay smaller dividends. 
Empirical results supported this guideline by finding a higher percentage of insider 
ownership and corresponding fewer agency problems associated with lower dividend 
yields. 
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Guideline 4: 
" This was developed because of the positive relationship between dividend 
history and dividend yield. 
Guideline 4 states that banks should use their dividend history to set dividend policy. 
Dickens et al's (2002) results support this guideline by showing that the previous 
year's dividend yield influenced the next year's dividend yield. 
Guideline 5: 
" Finally, this guideline was developed because of the negative relationship 
between risk factors and dividend yield. 
Guideline 5 states that banks that are subject to high risk should pay low dividends. 
Dickens et al's (2002) results showed a high coefficient of variation on earnings for 
the past five years (the high risk measure) being related to lower dividend yields. 
Dickens et al's (2002) state that the five dividend policy guidelines mentioned 
above can be useful to bank managers, regulators and investors when considering 
bank dividend policy. They indicate that further work is necessary to explore the 
additional factors that will suggest added guidelines in setting an optimal dividend 
policy for banking firms. They also believe that a more inconsistent economic period 
may find regulation and risk factors impacting bank dividends. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The information contained in Chapter 2 confirms that a great deal of reseach has 
been carried out in the past regarding dividend policy. However, the literature shows 
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that more research work on corporate dividend policy is still required, especially in the 
banking sector, which will enable researchers to work towards developing more 
unified theories on corporate dividend policy. 
The following chapter will present the optmal control theory framework for dividend 
determination as proposed by Davidson (1980) and subsequent chapters will focus 
on the empirical work carried out by this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRESENTING THE OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to present the optimal control theory model for dividend 
determination as proposed by Davidson (1980). Section 3.2 briefly discusses 
propositions identified by Davidson (1980), relating to the control theory framework for 
dividend determination. Section 3.3 presents all the key formulae of the optimal 
control theory model for dividend determination as presented by Davidson (1980) and 
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Discussion of the key issues regarding the optimal control theory 
framework 
According to Davidson (1980), the optimal control theory framework for dividend 
determination endeavours to achieve the following two objectives: 
1. To model indirectly the rational managerial behaviour rather than to model the 
valuation of the consumption stream of dividends paid out to shareholders. 
This is mainly because developing a dividend prediction model by analysing 
past dividends led to the Modigliani and Miller (1961) dividend irrelevance 
conclusion. 
2. To analyse the change of dividend components occurring, across time, or 
across different periods of time (intertemporally). 
Therefore, the optimal control theory framework simply explains the dividend changes 
across different periods based on rational managerial behaviour, rather than 
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supposing to be a standard model that is assumed to optimise the share valuation in 
the firm. Critics could argue that the issue of uncertainty is not properly addressed, 
since the model does not take explicit account of uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
managers still need to make plans, and they could place more emphasis on the 
projected dividends in the near future. 
The control theory framework for dividend determination presented in Section 3.3, 
utilises two key managerial based components of the objective function, which are: 
1. a utility of dividends function namely U(D(t)) , where D(t) dividends at time t, 
and 
2. a utility function for terminal `liquid assets', a pool of retained assets namely W 
(AT), where AT= retentions at time T (the end of the control planning horizon 
period). 
The managerial utility functions mentioned above are both from the family of concave 
utility functions as follows: 
U(D(t) = log D(t), which has a concave down (increasing) shaped graph; and 
W(AT) =b log AT, which has a concave down (increasing) shaped graph. 
The following are the assumptions made with regards to the optimal control theory 
model for divided determination: 
1. the dividends are determined by a managerial policy function that takes into 
account the changes that occur across different periods of time (intertemporal 
managerial policy function). 
2. The managerial policy function consists of the utility of dividends function, 
U(D(t), and the weighting function for terminal `liquid assets', W(AT) . 
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3. The graphs for the managerial policy functions mentioned above are concave 
in shape. Therefore, both the utility from the dividends and retentions 
mentioned above are assumed to be gradually increasing over time, and at a 
certain particular level the utility of the increase in both dividends and 
retentions becomes insignificant. 
4. The time element of the managerial policy function is weighted by a 
managerial time preference rate p (rho) estimated to be the cost of capital, ke, 
in this research study. 
5. The retentions at time t are assumed to be reinvested by the firm at the rate of 
interest Q (sigma). Davidson (1980) states that to avoid the confusion with 
accounting concepts of retained profits and capital maintenance, the 
retentions, A(t), are assumed to be stocks of liquid assets (effectively, 
operating or current assets), which in certain circumstances may be negative. 
In this research study, working capital has been used as an estimate for liquid 
assets. 
6. The income element, Y(t), is assumed to be exogenously determined. 
Specifically, the income before dividends reported in the organisation's profit 
and loss account has been treated as the income element for the control 
theory model in this study. 
7. Davidson (1980) stated that observations conducted by Lintner (1965) had 
demonstrated that investment policy appeared to have little direct effect on 
dividend change, and, due to this, investment policy functions were not 
considered explicitly by the optimal control theory framework for dividend 
determination. 
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8. In the control theory framework managers can plan dividends intertemporally 
over a finite control planning horizon or can relax the planning horizon to an 
infinite horizon. The control planning horizons examined in this research study 
are finite periods. The control planning horizon is defined by this study as the 
time period that is considered in the planning process. 
9. It is assumed that there is in operation a `liquid assets flow' type of system, 
such as the one used by Walter (1957), under which the managerial policy 
functions mentioned above, U(D(t)) and W(A(t)), are applied. Therefore, 
identifying stocks of liquid assets (working capital, net current assets) is 
important. 
10. The optimal control theory model assumes that there will be no external 
injection of capital into the organisation in the future. 
Davidson (1980) suggested that a control planning horizon of T= 100 determines 
higher dividend levels than other smaller planning horizons, such as T=1 and T=6. In 
fact, the T=100 control planning horizon approximately the highest possible dividend 
levels (being to all intents and purposes an infinite time period). A firm following a 
T=100 trajectory (route) is identified as being in a potentially risky situation as to all 
intents and purposes no minimum values are placed on liquid asset levels and 
dividends relate only to earnings. The results of a control planning horizon of T= 100 
are similar to those for an organisation which follows an infinite control planning 
horizon; it remains to be seen whether the results of this empirical research study 
supports any of the propositions suggested above. 
In Davidson (1980), it is argued that the infinite horizon model, and hence also the 
T=100 horizon model, is not likely to be a good explanator of observed behaviour. 
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Davidson (1980), however, suggests that a more acceptable viewpoint is that 
dividends relate to `long run' liquidity planned at a finite time horizon. Therefore the 
initial aim of this research study is: 
9 to examine the impact of different control planning horizons on projected 
dividends, and to evaluate how close these are to observed dividends realised 
in a modern USA banking environment. Further discussion of this is found in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
The optimal control theory model for divided determination presented below in 
Section 3.3, possesses several capabilities as follows: 
9 an ability to determine dividend values over both the short-run and the long- 
run periods; actually, this research study only focuses on the dividends that 
are determined by the control model over the short-run periods, since such 
dividends will be compared with the empirical data, covering the period 2001 to 
2005; 
" an ability to determine dividends applying both finite and infinite control 
planning horizons; in this thesis the projected dividends are only determined 
after applying finite control planning horizons; 
" an ability to determine both future dividend values and future liquid assets 
levels; and 
" an ability to explain dividend changes between periods (therefore determining 
intertemporal changes of dividends). 
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3.3 The framework of the optimal control theory model for dividend 
determination as presented by Davidson (1980) [a step-by-step 
presentation] 
In this subsection 3.3, Davidson's model is presented using his notation and 
procedures, as per his paper published in 1980. To enhance clarity the words and 
expressions used are frequently his. 
The optimal control theory framework for dividend determination initially utilises the 
following two key managerial policy functions: 
1. U (D (t)) = the dividend utility function, and 
2. W (A(T)) =a utility function for terminal liquid assets [function for the stocks of 
liquid assets, A, at time Tj. 
The problem in Davidson (1980) can be viewed as an investment versus consumption 
decision for managers. The liquid assets' position therefore determines the following: 
1. technical solvency (liquidity state of the organisation) and 
2. level of future dividends. 
The utility policy functions given above are used by the dividend control model, which 
is presented below as equation (1). These functions are assumed to exhibit 
decreasing marginal utility, and belong to a family of concave utility functions as 
shown below: 
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1). The utility of dividends curve [this is given later as equation (8)]: 
U(D(t)) = Log D(t) ................... when c=1 
and 
U(D(t)) _ (1-E)-1 D(t) (1-E) .................. when 0<E< infinity (except unity). 
2). The utility function for terminal asset [this is given later as equation (9)]: 
W(AT) =b (1 - q)-1 
AT (1-r1) 
....................... when 0<n< infinity (excpt unity) 
but 
W(AT)=b logAT 
.................................... when q= 1 
The following is the presentation of the dividend control theory model for dividend 
determination. Assuming that there is no external injection of capital, the dividend 
control theory model is represented symbolically as: 
Max [fU (D (t)) e-P` dt + W (A(T)) e-aT 
1 
.............................. 
(1) 
vidend utility 
action 
Managerial time 
preference rate p= 
rho = cost of capital 
= ke 
Utility function for 
terrninal liquid assets 
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NB : The above model is subject to the following conditions : 
dA/dt = aA(t) + Y(t) -D(t) ......... equation of motion .................................... (2) 
where Y(t) represents income at time t. 
A(0) = Ao ....................................... initial asset position ............................ (3) 
0 
.............................. non-negativity of dividend ............................... (4) 
A(T) = AT ........................... terminal liquid assets ...................................... (5) 
If the terminal asset position is not made explicit, as in equation (5), then it can be 
replaced by equation (6). 
U' (D(T)) = W' (A(T)) ................ transversality condition........................... (6) 
The latter equation ensures that the marginal utility of dividends at time T is equated 
to the marginal utility of assets at time T. 
Using the optimal control theory to find the path for dividends through time (t) 
We need to know how the dividends evolve through time. Davidson uses the optimal 
path below: 
dD/dt = (P-a) (UD/UDD) ..................................................................... 
(7) 
To help arrive at the above optimal path, the problem can be viewed as a 
Hamiltonian. The derivation of the optimal path model using the Hamiltonian 
approach is given below. 
Let : U(t) = U(c(t)) = utility function which is assumed to be increasing and concave in 
consumption (c). The object is to choose a consumption plan over a finite time 
horizon T which is optimal in the sense of maximizing the present value of the utility 
derived from this consumption, given the following: 
0p= the discount factor being the rate of time preference, 
9W= income earned per period as a continuous flow 
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9 rk(t) = unearned income per period, where: - 
-r= rate of interest 
- k(t) = the value of the non-human wealth at time t. 
It is assumed that it is a perfect capital market in which lending and borrowing takes 
place at a rate r, however there are some end-point constraints. At the beginning and 
at time T, zero nonhuman wealth is assumed. The problem thus takes the following 
form: 
The object is to maximize: 
T 
Max [jU (c (t), t) e-Pt dt 
0 
subject to. 
dk/dt =w+ rk (t) -- c(t) 
k(O) =0 
k(T) =0 
The Hamiltonian for the above problem is: 
H= U(c(t))e-Pt + y(t) [w + rk (t) - c(t)] 
and the corresponding Hamiltonian conditions are 
dH/dc = U' (c(t)) e -l' -y (t) =0 
. 
dH/dk=ry(t)=-y (t) 
0 
dH/dy=w+ rk(t)-c(t)= K 
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Solving the differential equation in dH/ dk, above we obtain, 
y(t) = y(0) e 
Substituting equation y(t) into dH/dc above we have after a little manipulation , 
U' (c(t)) = y(O) e'P-'t 
Differentiating the U' (c(t)) equation above with respect to time (t), we obtain, 
d U' (c(t)) / dt = (p-r) U' (c(t))...... this is the equation for the optimal consumption 
plan over a finite time horizon T. 
Applying the above to our dividend problem to establish equation (7) the optimal 
dividend path can be found. 
If a/ ax (dx/dt) + a/ ay (dy/dt) =0 
then, H(x, y) is a Hamiltonian. 
In our problem, Hamiltonian (H) is a function H (D, A, y, t), and 
dA/dt = QA(t) + Y(t) - D(t) [equation of motion : equation (2) above], 
a H/a y= dA/dt [the first maximum condition of Pontryagin], 
a H/ aA=- dy/dt [second maximum condition of Pontryagin], and 
a H/a D=0 [a first order condition]. 
Now 
H= U(D(t)) e-Pt + y(t) [Y + QA - D] 
But 
dA/dt = QA(t) + Y(t) - D(t), as above 
and 
a H/ aA= y(t) ß 
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Therefore 
dA/dt=Y+QA-D 
and y(t) c3 =- dy/dt 
Qy =- dyldt 
Qdt =- (1 /Y) dY 
Therefore 
T y(t) 
J adt=- $1/ydy o y(o) 
at = -[In(y(t) - Iny(0)] 
at = in (y(0)/y(t)) 
eat = Y(O)/ Y(t) 
Therefore : y(t) = y(o) e-°1 
since His a function H(D, A, y, t) 
then 
a H/ aD=a/aD (U(D(t) ) e-Pt )+a/a D( Y(t) [Y + QA-D) 
=alaU (U e-Pt )d U/d D+ 3I a D(y(t) [Y+aA-D] ) 
=e -pt U' + (-y(t)). 
At max utility, a H/ aD=0. 
Therefore : 
e -Pt U+ (-y(t)) =0 
Therefore : 
e _Pt U' = (Y(t)) 
Therefore : 
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U, =e pt (Y(t)) 
From earlier : y(t) =y (0) e -°' 
Therefore : 
UI = yo e(p Q)t 
d/dD (U' )= d/dD (dU/dD) = d/dD (yo e(P-0)t ) 
= d/dt (yo e(p-0)t ) dt / dD . 
UDD = (P-a) Yo e(P-)t dt/dD . 
Therefore : dD/dt =[ (p-Q) yo e(P-G)t ]/ UDD 
But : U' = UD = yo e(P-0)t as earlier. 
Therefore 
, 
dD/ dt = (P-Q) UD I UDD ......................................................................................... (7) 
(which is Davidson's (1980) equation (7)). 
Equation dD / dt above is the rate of change in dividends over time, whose result is 
quoted by Davidson (1980) , citing 
Strotz (1956). In Davidson (1980), the need to 
apply Pontryagin's Maximum Principles explicitly to the maximized Hamiltonian is 
prevented although application of the Maximum Principle is implicitly applied. 
The following section applies the utility policy functions to the optimal path for 
changes in dividends given by equation (7) above. When the utility policy functions ( 
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equation 8 and equation 9) are applied accordingly to the dividend path (equation 7) 
the specific control model is determined. 
Let equation (8) be: 
1). The utility of dividends curve: (8) .......................................................... 
U(D(t)) = Log D(t) ................... when E=1 
and 
U(D(t)) = (1-E: )-1 D(t) (1-£) .................. when 0< c< 1, 
as discussed earlier, but repeated here for convenience. 
Let equation (9) be: 
2). The utility function for terminal asset ................................................ (9) 
W(AT)=b (1 -r)-1 
AT(1-0) 
....................... when 0<n< 1 
and 
W(AT)=b logAT 
.................................... when q= 1, 
as discussed earlier, but repeated here for convenience. 
In applying the transversality condition, it is necessary to define the utility function for 
terminal assets, which is presented in equation (9). Here, a scalar weighting `b' is 
introduced as part of the utility function for terminal assets. It needs to be mentioned 
that AT is derived and not predetermined. 
Applying (7) to (8) to determine the dividend, D(t) 
First of all, the rate of change in dividends over time is: 
dD / d(t) =[ (P-a) Yo e(p-° ]/ [d2U / (dD)2] = UD (P-a) 
I UDD. 
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From equation (8), let: 
U(D(t)) = log (D(t)) . 
Therefore 
dU i dD = U' = 1/ D(t) = D-1 .......... when D(t) =D 
dU'ldD=d(dU/d'D)/dD=dUD/dD=(d2U/dD2)=UDD= U" =-1/D2 
but from .............................................................. (7) 
dD / d(t) = (p-6) UD / UDD 
But: U= log (D(t)) 
Therefore: 
UD = D'1 
and 
UDD=-D- 2 
Therefore: 
dD / d(t) =- (p-cs) (D-1) / D-2 =- (p-Q) D 
Therefore, using separation by parts: 
dD/ D= -(p-Q)dt. 
Therefore: 
DT 
f (1/D)dD J (p-Q)dt. 
Do 0 
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Therefore: 
log (D)-log (Do) _- (p - Q) t 
log (D/Do)=-(p-Q)t. 
Therefore : 
D/ Do = e-(P-Q)t 
Therefore, for E=1: 
D(t) = D(o) exp [Q- p)/ E]t ............................................................... (10) 
N. B. However, for a different utility function: 
Let U= (1-E )-' D(t) ('-E) .... 
for 0< c< 1 
dU/dD = (1-F-) (1-F-)-' D (1-£-1) =D -E 
d2U/(dD)2 = -F- D(-£-') 
Therefore : 
dD/dt = (UD/UDD) . (p-ß) _ 
[From 
.. 
(7) 
= -(p-Q) / ED-1 =- D(p-Q) /E 
Therefore : 
[(D-') / (-ED-'-, )] . 
(p-Q) 
dD/dt =D (Q- p) /E......... where D= D(t) 
8ý 
Therefore : 
j (dD/D) =J (1/D) dD = 
Therefore: 
In(D/Do) =(ß-p)t/E 
Therefore: 
.1 
«a- p)/ £] d(t) 
D(t) = D(o) exp [Q- p)/ E]t ............................................................................ (10) 
b). The Exogenous Income Y 
Now in (b) we consider Y income. Income is assumed to exhibit a geometric growth 
rate 'g'. 
Therefore: 
Y(t) = Yoegt ............................................................................. 
(11) 
Or 
Change in Y(t) =g Yoegt = gY(t) . ............................................ 
(11 a) 
Considering the Transverality condition - (relating to the time at the end of the 
planning period `T') 
From equation (6) U' (D(T)) = W' (A(T)) 
Therefore at time `T' : 
dU /dD = dW/dA which can also be written as 
UD = WA = n(T) 
where n(T) is the multiplier or shadow price at time T T. 
We now apply the transversality condition to equations (8) and (9). 
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From earlier, 
dU/dD = (1-E) (1-£)-' D (l-'-1) =D -' 
and 
the utility function W(AT) =b (1 - q) -1 
AT (1 -n) 
dW/dA = W' =b (1 -n)-1 (1 -n) AT('-'-') = bAT -n 
Therefore at `T' 
dU/dD = dW/dA= D -£ =b AT -n 
1/DE=b/ AT9 
AT'=bD£ 
Hence, liquid assets at time `T' are : 
(12) AT = (b DT F)1i n .............................................................. ........... 
In respect of the transversality, there is a tradeoff at the horizon date, in which 
terminal assets are a function of terminal dividends, including a scalar weighting, V. 
The terminal dividends are derived, and hence not predetermined by the model. 
Now we incorporate the utility functions stated in equations (8) and (9) into the 
original model equation numbered (1). After incorporating utility functions stated in 
equation (8) and (9), the expression becomes: 
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T 
Max 
0 
(1-c)-, p('-E) e-Pt dt + 
vidend utility 
riction 
NB: - Where (¬9q >0) 
b(1_n)-' AT ('-n) e-PT J ................................ (13) 
anagerial time 
eference rate p= 
o= cost of capital 
ke 
Utility function for 
terminal liquid assets 
(Member of general 
family of concave 
utility functions) 
Equation (13) above is subject to the following conditions, as stated earlier, which 
include: 
dA/dt =A= QA +Y -D.... (14).... this is equivalent to the equation of motion, which is 
equation (2) 
A(0) = Ao ............... 
(15)... this represents the initial asset position, which is equation 
(3) 
D(T) = (A- b-')"E .... 
(16) 
NB: In this new model D (T) is not necessarily zero, but cannot be negative, in 
accordance with the non-negativity condition of constraint equation (4). 
88 
Simplifying the equations since both changes in D and A are now known: 
Firstly, use the change in A to establish the equation for A(t) . 
From equation (14), we note that: 
ChangeinA=Y+GA -D 
Multiplying the function by e-"' gives 
A e-0t =Y e-ßt+ QA e-"t -D e-Qt 
Therefore : 
Äeß -aAe-`t = Ye0t-De-0t 
Rewriting the above equation gives 
d (A e-0t) /dt =Y e0t-D eat 
Therefore integrating as an inverse function of a derivative 
t 
t [A e-at 10=JY e-°t dt -JD e-'' dt J00 
tt 
A e-mot - A° e° =fY e-6t dt -JD eyo' dt 
00 
Multiply by eot 
tt 
A e-Ot ea{ - A° e° eat = e"t 
$Y e-`t dt - e0t 
$D e-°t dt 
00 
Therefore : 
rr 
A= AO eat + et JYe -t dt - et 
JDe -t = A(t) .................. 
(17) 
00 
But: 
Y= YO eg. ........ 
(11) and D= Do eýQ-p)t/E ............... 
(10) 
89 
Substituting the above functions into equation (17) and integrating, gives: 
A= Ao ecrt + et J Yo egt e-ot dt - e0t 
J Do e(Q -P )t iE e-0t dt = A(t) 
00 
tt 
A= Ao ecyt + e° f Yo e(c -Q)t dt - ec 
( Do e[(° -ß)]t dt = A(t) 
0 of t t 
A= Ao eGt +e cyt { Yo e(g -6)t / (g- Q)] 0- e° 
[ Do g«a - p)IE -v It / [(ß - P)/(£ -o)}] 0 
A(t) = Ao e° t+ e°' [ Yo e(g -0)t / (g- ß) - Yo / (g- c3) 
]- 
eat [ Do el(0 - p)IE -0 )It / [(Q - p)/E _a)] - Do / [(a - p)/(E: -a)]] 
let : 
(g- Q) =j and i= (6 - p)ic 
Therefore A(t) then becomes: 
A(t) = Ao e° t+ eQ t[( Yo eilt / j) - Yo / (7) 
]-eQt[ Do el'-Qlt / LEI -a)] - Do I [(i -a)]] 
From the above equation A(T) is then: 
A(T) = eß r [A0 +( Yo / 1) ( e(i)T _ 1) - D0 / (i -a) (e[i-0]T _ 1)] ................. 
(18) 
Rearranging the above equation enable us to establish Do 
Therefore: 
A(T) e-Q T= e-0 T eß T 
[Ao + (Yo /j) (eci)T _ 1) - Do / (i _Q) (e[i-Q]7 _ 1)] 
A(T) e-Q T= e(-Q T +Q T) [Ao + (Yo / j) (eW)T - 1) - Do / (i -ß) (e[` d]T - 1)] 
Divide all functions by (e [i- °1T - 1) 
A(T) e -a T/ (efi- a JT _ 1) = 1/ (e['-0iT - 1) 
[Ao + (Yo / j) ( e(J)T _ 1) 
]- Do / (i -a) 
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Multiply all functions by..... (i -Q) 
(A(T) e- Q T)( (i -ci) / (e[i- Q IT _ 1) = (i _Q) / (eFi- Q IT _ 1) 
[Ao + (Yo /j) ( eW)T - 1) 
]- D0 
Therefore: 
D0 = (I -Q) / (e[iy0]T - 1) 
[[A0 + (Yo / ]) ( ew)T - 1)] - (A(T) e-(jT) 
Therefore : 
Do = (i _Q) (e[i- ß ]T _ 1)-, 
[A0 
-A(T) e-Q T+ (Yo /j) (eW)T _ 1)] 
] 
............ (19) 
From equation (18), which gives us A(T) we can establish the equation for A(t) : 
Since : 
A(T) = eQ r [Ao + (yo / 1) ( eWWWT _ 1) - Do / (i _Q) (eý'- d]T _1 )] ............... (18) 
Therefore A(t) is : 
A(t) = eQ c [Ao + (Yo / J) ( eO)' - 1) - Do / (I _o) (el'-"l' - 1)] ................. (20) 
Since Do is given by (19), and AT is given by equation (12), then the plan is to 
substitute for AT in equation (19) and to rearrange. 
...................................................................... 
(12) AT=( bDT E)119 
D(t) = D©exp {[(6-p) /E ] t1................................................................. (10) 
Let : 
(Q-p)/E =i 
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Therefore: 
DT = Do exp (iT) and AT = (bDT E) 119 = (b(Do exp [(a-p) T/ E]) E) 1/9 =(b(Do e iT) E) 1/q 
= AT. 
Substituting for AT in equation (19) and rearranging gives: 
Do = (i _a) (e[i- Q)]T _ I)-1 
[Ao 
- (b(Do e iT) C) 1 /n e-Q T+ (Yo / J) (eW)T _1 )l 
I 
Therefore rearranging gives: 
Do + (b(Do e iT) E) 
119 
e-a T. (i -a) le 
i- a)]T 
_1 1-1 = 
(i -Q) (e[i- Q 
)Jr 
_ 1)-1 . 
[Ao + (Yo / J) (e(i)T _ 1)] ......................... (21) 
Equation (21) is very important since it enables us to find Do when AO and Yo are 
known. 
Intertemporai Change of Dividend 
{Change of dividend within periods (financial trading periods), are established by 
Davidson (1980) by adopting the simple partial adjustment and adaptive expectations 
empirical models, which perform well and which lead to reduced form equations 
which are similar from the viewpoint of conventional estimation. } 
Along the dividend path through time, changes in dividends between financial 
periods can be evaluated. 
The previous period will be denoted as (r -1) and the current period as simply T. 
From equation (19), substitute Do for D (T -1. 
Do = (i _Q) (e[i- Q 
)lT 
_ 1)-l 
[Ao 
_A(T) e-ß 
T+ (Yo / J) (eÜ)T _ 1)] 
] 
........... 
(19) 
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Therefore equation (19) becomes: 
D(r 
- 1) 
= (I -Q) 
(e P- a IT 
- 1)-1 
[A01 
- 1) _AT(r -1) e-QT + (Y0 /j) (2OT -1 
)] I 
Therefore also Dr = (i -Q) (e[i-vlT _ 1)-1 
[Ao(T)_A, ) e-Q T+( Yo /j) ( eO)T _ 1)] 
]. 
Therefore change of dividend between periods is D, - D(T -,. 
Therefore: 
Dz - D(T -1) = 
(i -ß) (e 
F- a]T - 1)-, 
[Ao(T) 
-AT(T) e- QT+ (Yo / j) (eO)T - 1)] 
]- (l 
-a) 
(el'- o 
]T 
- 
1)-1 {A0T -1) _AT(1-1) e-Q T+ (Yo /j) ( eW)T - 1)] 
Rearranging the above equation gives: 
DT - D(1-1) = 
[(ATT) 
- AT(T -1)) e-Q T_ (A0(T) - A0 (' -1)) - (1 / j)(Yo r- yo (r -1)) (ea WT - 
1 )1/ [ (i _Q) -1 (1 - e[i-u]T) 
] 
................................................................... (22) 
Now, assume the following: 
Yo (r -1) = Y0(r) e-9 
and 
Ao(r) = A(l) ('- 1) . 
Therefore from equation (20), reprinted below: 
A(t) = e0 c [Ao + (Yo / j) ( eW)t - 1) - Do r( _o) (e['- Q 
It 
- 1)] ...................... 
(20) 
becomes: 
A(, )( 
' -1 )=eQ [A0 (T- 1) + (Yo(T) e-9 / 1) (eW) - 1) - DT-1 / (i -Q) (ec- Q]- 1)] (22 a) 
From earlier: 
per 
- 1= 
(i _a) (e[i- Q 
)T 
_1 )-l 
[A01-1) 
-AT 
(T -1) e-a T+( Yo / j) ( eO)T _1 )J 
1 
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and D1 _ (i -Q) (e[i- d]T _ 1)-1 
[A0(T) 
_AT(T e-Q T+ (Yo /j) (eO)T _1 )l 
I, 
therefore, using equation (22a) : 
D- D(z 
-l= 
[[(AT(T )- AT(T - 1)) e-Q T+ Ao(T -1) (1 _eG) 
]+ [(1 /j) {(e-i - 1) + (e-9 - 1) (eT - 1)}j y0(T) + 
eQ . (e"-Q) -1 )/ (i_ Q) ] D(T -1) 
]/ [(i 
-a) -1 (1 - e[i-Q]T) 
I 
The above equation is of the form: 
DT- D(T 
-1) =a+ b1 YT + b2 D(, -1) ............................................ (23) 
Where : 
a_ (AT(r - 1) _ 
AT(r )) e-Q T+ Ao(r -1) (e° _ 1) ]z................................. (24) 
bi = [1/ (o-9) { (e(° -g) -1) + (e-9 _1) (e(9-Q)T _1) }]Z............................... (25) 
b2 : -: [[ £e 6/ (P+Q(£-1)) ]. (e («Q -p )/£ - Q) -1) lz............................ (26) 
and 
Z= [(Q - (a-p)/£) (1 - e[ 
(Q -p )£- Q)]T)-1 ] ................................. (26b) 
To quote Davidson (1980), `The values of b1 and b2 are found to be quite small, 
these terms capturing mainly interest and elasticity terms ; b, is the coefficient of the 
exogenous income Y(t) ; and a shows all items pertaining to liquid assets. The above 
equations determine future dividends for the organisation'. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has confirmed that the optimal control theory for dividend determination 
presented by Davidson (1980) has several purposes and functions which are all 
relevant and important in enabling researchers to understand the dividend 
determination process. However, relevant empirical work is still required to enable 
researchers to exploit fully all the benefits that the control model has to offer. Some 
will be carried out in this thesis and suggestions about further empirical work that can 
be carried out in the future are identified in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE DATA, VARIABLES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two key parts. Part One (4.2 and 4.3) of this chapter 
introduces the sample data and variables that form the backbone of the statistical 
analysis in the thesis. Part Two (4.4 and 4.5) of this chapter presents the research 
hypotheses to be tested throughout the thesis. The methodology employed to test the 
hypotheses is also outlined in this second part of Chapter 4. 
4.2 Part One - Data employed for the research 
The data employed in this thesis are secondary data from Advanced Financial 
Network (ADVFN) on-line database. The secondary data provide a reliable and 
precise source of data for the research investigation. 
4.2.1 The secondary data from ADVFN 
The secondary data that are utilised for this study relate to banking corporations listed 
on the NYSE. 
To validate the data gathered from ADVFN, some of the collected figures were 
compared to data published on DataStream database and both databases proved to 
contain similar financial figures. 
The main advantage of using secondary data from ADVFN is that vast financial 
resources can be collected easily within a short period of time for free on-line. In 
addition the data from ADVFN are high quality accurate and relevant data required by 
this study. The key disadvantage is that the only complete free financial information 
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available on ADVFN is NYSE financial information. Information for the other major 
stock markets in the world is very costly and not easy to access. 
The primary users of ADVFN database are stock brokers and financial analysts. 
The ADVFN database can also be utilised by academics for their research due to the 
accuracy of information and extensive coverage of this database. ADVFN database 
provides data on most stock markets in the world at a cost and gives details of many 
financial accounts and economic items. 
Retrieving data from A'DVFN is very easy. All banking corporations that are listed 
on the NYSE are reported under financial group and banking sector. The banking 
sector is further divided into ten sub-sectors as follows: 
" USA money centre banks, 
9 USA regional -Northeast banks, 
" USA regional - Mid-Atlantic banks, 
" USA regional - Southeast banks, 
9 USA regional - Midwest banks, 
" USA regional - Southwest banks, 
" USA regional - Pacific banks, 
" Foreign Money Centre banks, 
" Foreign regional banks and 
" USA savings and loans banks. 
The on-line ADVFN - Industry sector search enabled easy collection 
all the relevant 
data required for this study. The ADVFN database 
does not require program and 
code numbers to retrieve and display data on the 
database; it only requires the name 
of the corporation. 
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4.2.2 Description of data collected 
Tables 4.1 and 4.3 show the two main groups of data gathered and constructed to 
constitute the data for this study. Table 4.1 below contains the first set of data 
collected, which consists of all the elements of the optimal control theory model. 
Obtaining all the relevant elements of the control theory model enables this research 
to investigate the effectiveness of the control theory in predicting future dividends for 
banks listed on the NYSE. 
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Table 4.1 The 12 key elements of the optimal control theory 
Symbol Description Notes 
1 Ao Liquid assets (working capital), at the 
beginning of planning period at time zero See 4.2.2.1 below 
2 Yo Income before dividends at beginning of Data collected from banks' 
profit and loss accounts 
planning period at time zero statements 
3 Do Determination of dividends at the beginning NO data collected as this 
element is determined by the 
of planning period at time zero control theory model 
4 At Liquid assets (working capital), at the end of NO data collected as this 
element is determined by the 
period t-1, (beginning of year t) control theory model 
5 rl Eta Equal to one (1) = unity 
* see note below 
6 Epsilon Equal to one (1) = unity 
see note below 
7 b Weighting factor b See Section 5.2 for details 
8 Q Sigma Return on retentions z return 
on capital employed. 
Information is reported by 
ADVFN 
9 p Rho = Ke Cost of capital - constructed 
here using CAPM, see 
A endfix 1 
10 __ g Growth rate of income Growth rate of income = (Total 
current income less Previous 
income) I Previous income 
11 T The planning horizon date The planning horizon date 
12 t A point in time tt [0, T] A point in time tt [0, T] 
*= Justification of why the elasticities have been assumes to oe unity ksee 
below): 
The simple logarithmic model has an `Arrow-Pratt' Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) 
value of unity: 
RRA = -x U" (x) / 
U' (x), following Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964). 
Hence, when U(x) = log x, 
RRA=-x(-x-2)/X 1=1. 
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The elasticities contained in Table 4.1 above (q and E) have been assumed to be 
unity. 
Past reseach which has investigated the value of RRA has reported wide ranging 
values between 0.09 to 7.29. This suggests the following, that: 
" the RRA is a difficult value to measure, or 
the RRA might not be constant at all, resulting in each one individual or 
groups of individuals possessing different RRA according to their 
different wealth levels. This is consistent with Morin and Suarez's 
(1983) findings, who used Canadian data to conduct their analysis. 
The reseach conducted by Litzenberger and Ronn (1986) reported a RRA value of 
4.22 based on a utility of consumption model of stock prices. Grossman and Schiller 
(1981) obtained an estimate value of 4.0. The results of both the above (1986) and 
(1981) research show RRA values significally different from unity. It is cited in 
Davidson (1986) that Friend and Blume (1975) and Blume and Friend (1975) used 
wealth data in their research and found a constant value of RRA ranging from 2.5 to 
4. Lower values of RRA have been reported by Hansen and Signleton (1982), who 
used consumption data for their research study. Our selected value of unity for the 
elasticities above are with in the value range reported by Hansen and Singleton 
(1982) who used the more appropriate consumption data. 
4.2.2.1 Constructing the substitute for working capital at the start of the 
planning period: Ao 
Establishing the value of working capital of banking corporations is a challenge 
because the banks listed on the NYSE do not explicitly report it (in the traditional 
100 
sense) nor provide financial information which enables a computation of it. Therefore 
to solve this problem this research has taken the following two steps to establish a 
substitute for working capital. 
Firstly, what is the meaning of working capital? According to accounting literature 
by Atrill and McLaney (2004), working capital measures how much in liquid assets a 
company has available to build its business. In other words working capital indicates 
the organisation's assets which are free from risk (risk free assets). Analysts view 
working capital items as a sign of a company's efficiency, financial strength, success, 
expansion capacity and improvement opportunities. 4 
The results of a survey conducted by the consulting firm Hackett-REL, published in 
the Manufacturing Business Technology (2006) contributes that working capital is the 
capital invested in operating processes to generate profit and that the ability to impact 
the bottom line through working capital optimization is tremendous. Optimal capital 
adequacy for any business is vital. 
The second step involves identifying the assets for a bank which are free from risk. 
The bank's risk free assets indicate the bank's efficiency, financial strength, success, 
expansion capacity and improvement opportunities. 
4.2.2.2 Calculating a bank's Risk Free Assets (RFA) 
Risk free assets are calculated in three phases: 
Phase 1: - Requires the Basel I risk weights, 
(RW), for the balance sheet assets. 
The Basel Committee, an international banking regulator, produced Basel I which is 
the international standard used by banks to measure the adequacy of a bank's 
capital. The Basel I Accord provides a step by step process which 
details the 
4 Atrill, P. and McLaney, E. (2004), Accounting and Finance for Non-specialists, 
4h Edition (2004), 
Published by Prentice Hall 
101 
determination of a bank's capital adequacy requirement. The Basel I agreement 
presents a list of the risk weights for balance sheet assets. The Basel committee and 
other published literature on banking regulation all supply a list of the necessary risk 
weights which are applied to the balance sheet assets to establish the risk weighted 
assets for a bank. 5 This study used the Basel committee website and other relevant 
published literature on banking regulations to pick-out all the relevant risk weights 
which are contained in Table 4.2. Appendix 5 contains some key aspects of the 
capital requirement regulation used to establish the relevant risk weights. 
Phase 2: - Conversion of the gathered Risk Weights into Risk Free Weights (RFW) 
In phase 1 above the Basel I risk weights collected are expressed as a percentage. 
This enables the researcher to convert the collected risk weights into risk free weights 
using the formula detailed below: 
100 - risk weights (RW) = risk free weights (RFW) [ie. 100 - RW = RFW]. 
Table 4.2 details the transformed Basel iI Risk Weights into Risk Free Weights for 
relevant balance sheet assets applicable to banks listed on the NYSE. 
Phase 3: - Determining the balance sheet risk free assets (RFA) for banks 
To calculate the risk free assets for appropriate banks this thesis multiplies the 
monetary value of assets on the balance sheet by the appropriate risk free weight 
(RFW) given in Table 4.2. The product equals balance sheet risk free weighted 
assets for banking corporations. 
http: //www, bis-Or /publ/bcbsca. htm 
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Table 4.2 The table converting the Basel I Risk Weights into Risk Free Weights 
Balance sheet assets Risk Weights Risk Free Weights 
Cash and equivalent 0 100 
Treasury bills 10 90 
Other eligible bills 20 80 
UK government stocks 20 80 
" Loan stocks also known as Bonds 
" Gilt-edged securities / gilts 
Commercial / personal loans 
100 0 
Mortgage loans 50 50 
Premises 
, 
Fixed assets 100 0 
Goodwill 0 0 
Cash in the course of collection 
20 80 
Fixed interest securities issued by government of 
developed countries with residual maturity of more than 20 80 
one year 
Fixed interest securities issued by government of 10 90 
developed countries with residual maturity of less than 
one year 
Source of risk weights: 
" MacDonald, S. S and Koch, T. W. (2006), 
" Basel I capital accord Published by The Federal Reserve Board 
6 
" Instruction for part 2 calculation of risk weighted assets, Published by Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (Banking Review) 
" Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
8 
6 http: //federal reserve gov/generalinfo/base12/DraftNPR/NPR/Part 
4. htm 
http: //www. fdic. qov 
s http: //www. bis. orq/pubi/bcbsca. htm 
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4.3 Sample construction 
A suitable sample of approximately 250 banks is constructed from a population of 
over 1000 banking corporations that are listed on the NYSE. The following three (3) 
stages are followed by this study to select the research sample: 
Stage 1: - Identification of all banks listed on the NYSE 
Banks listed on the NYSE as of August 2006 are classified into ten (10) different 
regional groupings. Ten (10) different Excel spreadsheets are used to record all 
banks according to the bank's appropriate regional grouping. 
Stage 2: - Establishing the number of banks to be included in the research sample 
from each regional category. In this study, the ten different regional groupings 
mentioned above contain a varied number of banks. In accordance with Saunders el 
at (2006), where the regional groups had a smaller number of banks, the entire group 
is selected to constitute the research sample. Where the regional groupings 
contained a large number of banks, twenty-five (25) banks were randomly selected. 
Where regional groupings had smaller numbers, the whole group was selected. 
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Table 4.3 The size of regional groupings 
Names of the regional groupings for 
banks that are listed on the NYSE Size of the Notes 
regional grouping 
1 USA Money centre banks Small Whole population selected to make up part 
of the research sample 
2 USA regional - Northeast banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
3 USA regional - Mid-Atlantic banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
4 USA regional - Southeast banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
5 USA regional - Midwest banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
6 USA regional - Southwest banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
7 USA regional - Pacific banks Large Sample is randomly selected 
8 Foreign Money centre banks Small Whole population selected to make up part 
of the research sample 
Small Whole population selected to make up part 
9 Foreign regional banks of the research sample 
Large Sample is randomly selected 
10 Savings and Loans 
Approximately 250 banks selected 
Total [See Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 for some 
information on NYSE banks] 
Stage 3: - The random selection of banks from the large regional groupings 
All the banks identified in stage I are allocated a special random number, which is 
generated by the Excel random function: [=rand ()] . 
All the generated random numbers for each bank are copied and pasted in the next 
column on the Excel spreadsheet without the formulae. This process freezes and 
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holds the generated random number. The frozen random numbers are arranged in 
descending order by the Excel sort function. 
The total number of banks selected from all regional groupings, which make up a total 
of about 250 banks, is the sample for this research study. The research hypotheses 
for this thesis are tested on approximately 250 banks that constitute the sample for 
this study. 
4.4 Part two- Research Methodology - The estimation procedures of dividend 
levels through the use of the control theory model and details of the 
investgations undertaken to enable further insights into the control theory 
model 
This research study utilised the control theory model to estimate dividend levels for 
NYSE banks. The following section 4.4.1 below details the procedures followed by 
this research to: 
" estimate the dividend levels using the control theory model and 
" to establish insights into the behaviour of dividends within the control 
theory 
model. 
4.4.1 The research procedures applied in this study 
The procedures followed by this study can be divided into three 
distinctive processes 
as follows: 
" the initial process involved estimating 
the dividend levels, 
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" the subsequent process (the intermediate process) involved conducting 
relevant analysis to establish the characteristics of those NYSE banks, whose 
actual dividend patterns more closely matched those determined by the control 
theory model, and 
9 the final process identified the characteristics of NYSE banks that out- 
performed the optimal control theory model. 
4.4.1.1 The initial research process - the basic control theory estimation 
procedures 
The objective of this initial process was to investigate some fundamental arguments, 
put forward by Davidson (1980), which suggest that infinite horizon models, such as 
the T=100 horizon model, are not likely to be good explanators of observed dividend 
behaviour. Davidson (1980), however, suggests that a more acceptable viewpoint is 
that dividends relate to `long run' liquidity planned at a finite time horizon. 
It is therefore the initial hypothesis of this research study to test empirically the 
impact of distant control planning horizons and other different finite control time 
horizons and observe the dividend behaviour. The research question answered in this 
section of the study was therefore: Is the optimal control planning horizon for NYSE 
banks a finitely low horizon as suggested by Davidson (1980) or not? ' 
The associated hypotheses that were tested by the initial processes included: 
H1 : low finite control planning horizons determine the level of dividends, of 
NYSE banking corporations. 
Null Hypothesis 1 
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Ho (1 ): low finite control planning horizons do not determine the level of 
dividends. Therefore high control planning horizons such as T= 100 will 
determine dividends. 
The procedure to estimate the dividend levels for each bank at different planning 
horizons in this reseach began by studying and understanding the optimal control 
theory model in depth and breaking down the formulae of the model. The next stage 
involved designing suitable Microsoft -Excel spreadsheets and entering accordingly 
the formulae of the optimal control theory model on to Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. 
This work was followed by testing that the formulae entered on the Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets worked efficiently and effectively in determining required dividends. 
Formulae that were entered on the research's spreadsheets were tested using the 
examples published in the literature, as follows: 
a) Complete verified published data previously presented in the literature were 
applied to these research spreadsheets. 
b) The determined dividends produced by the research spreadsheets were compared 
with the published answers of predicted dividends. 
c) When the research spreadsheets produced similar results to the published 
examples, the constructed spreadsheets were accepted as accurate. [The above 
mentioned procedure can be termed `building excel spreadsheets containing control 
theory formulae phase'. ] 
After the spreadsheets that determine dividend levels were constracted, relevant 
data were required to be fed into the spreadsheets. This process involved identifying 
all the financial elements required by the optimal control theory model to determine 
future dividends and collecting the necessary data. The results of the determined 
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dividend levels, that the research spreadsheets estimated, are fully discussed in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
4.4.1.2 The intermediate processes - identifying characteristics of NYSE banks, 
whose actual dividends closely snatched those determined by the control 
theory model 
The intermediate procedures follow on after having identified in Chapter 5 NYSE 
banks, whose actual dividends closely matched those determined by the control 
theory model. The objective of the intermediate processes is to identify the financial 
characteristics of the identified banks. Of course, some of the dividend policy factors 
for banks that other researchers have identified as significant might very well also be 
significantly associated with the control theory model. So, these will be tested. 
The associated hypotheses that will be tested by the intermediate procedures include 
the following: 
Alternative hypothesis 2A 
H2 A: NYSE banks with control-theoretic dividends are characterised 
by low 
investment. 
Null Hypothesis 2A 
Ho (2A) : NYSE banks with control-theoretic 
dividends are not characterised by low 
investment. 
Alternative hypothesis 2B 
H2 B: NYSE banks, with control-theoretic 
dividends are characterised by low risk. 
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Null Hypothesis 2B 
Ho (2B) : NYSE banks, with control-theoretic dividends, are not characterised by low 
risk. 
Alternative hypothesis 2C 
H2 c: NYSE banks, with control-theoretic dividends are characterised by being a large 
bank in size. 
Null Hypothesis 2C 
Ho (2C): NYSE banks, with control-theoretic dividends, are not characterised by being 
a large bank in size. 
Alternative hypothesis 2D 
H2 D: NYSE banks, with control-theoretic dividends are characterised by possessing a 
high dividend history. 
Null Hypothesis 2D 
Ho (2D) : NYSE banks, with control-theoretic dividends, are not characterised by 
possessing a high dividend history. 
The procedures to establish the characteristics of the control-theoretic NYSE banks 
began by using relevant dividend policy literature contained in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
to identify the key constructs. The identified dividend policy constructs were translated 
into operational terms, typically ratios. All the variables mentioned above, and other 
110 
additional appropriate variables were grouped to form the completed set of the 
independent variables as disclosed by Table 4-4 below. 
Table 4.4 The list of independent variables collected for this study 
Table 4-4 Variable Formula 
1 Debt Ratio Debt ratio = Total debt I Total assets 
2 Gearing Ratio Loan Capital / total capital employed 
3 Leverage Ratio Total debt I Shareholder's equity 
4 Dividend Yield Dividend policy (dividend yield) = dividend per share I share price 
5 Dividend Payout Ratio Dividend policy ( payout ratio) = dividend paid / net income (profit) 
6 Return on Equity Net Income (One yr's earning)/ Shareholder's Equity 
7 Return on Assets Net Income (One yr's earning)/ Total Assets 
8 Return on Capital Invested Net Income (One yr's earning)/ Capital Invested 
9 Revenue Growth Rate 
Revenue growth rate = (Total current revenue now LESS previous revenue) 
/previous revenue 
10 Income Growth Rate 
Income growth rate = (Total current income now LESS previous 
income)/previous income 
11 Dividend Growth Rate 
Dividend growth rate = (Total dividend now LESS previous 
dividend)/previous dividend 
12 
Percentage of the cash flow in 
the share price 
Liquidity indicator 
Percentage of the cash flow in the share price = (Cash flows per share/ 
share price) *(100) = [(Cash flow / number of 
shares)/(Share price)]*100 
13 Tobin's Q Ratio 
Total market value of the company (according to price traders) I Current 
cost of replacing firm's existing assets 
Or 
Value of stock market / corporate net worth 
14 
Share price / Book value of 
assets 
Price / Book Ratio 
[Market to Book Value Ratio] 
15 Employee size Log of the number of employees 
The data for the independent variables (`X' variables), mentioned above in Table 4.4, 
were collected from the ADVFN database. Further descriptions of the variables are 
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contained in Appendix 2. Firms that exhibit a control-theoretic dividend payment (see 
Chapter 6) are allocated a value of one for 'Y', and those that do not are given a value 
of zero. A logistic step-wise regression procedure is to be used to identify the factors 
that are associated whether the NYSE banks pay dividends that can be described as 
`control-theoretic'. Further details of the work that was carried out in the intermediate 
stage and the results attained from the intermediate processes are given in Chapter 6 
of this thesis. 
4.4.1.3 The final set of procedures undertaken by this research to identify the 
characteristics of NYSE banks that out-perform the control theory model 
The key objective of this final section of the study is to establish the characteristics of 
NYSE banks that out-perform the control model. Out-performers of the control model 
are the banks that pay higher actual dividends compared with the dividends 
determined by the control model. The fundamental research question that this section 
of the study answers is: Which dividend policy factors are associated with out- 
performers of the control theory model? 
The detailed step by step procedures carried out in the final stage of this study are 
given in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Relevant to the dividend literature already discussed, 
the associated hypotheses that are tested in this section are detailed below. 
Alternative hypothesis 3A 
H3A: Out-performers of the control theory model tend to be associated with low 
investment. 
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Null hypothesis 3A 
HQ (3A): Out-performers of the control theory model tend not to be associated with low 
investment. 
Alternative hypothesis 3B 
H3B: Out-performers of the control theory model tend to be associated with low risk. 
Null hypothesis 3B 
Ho (3B): Out-performers of the control theory model tend not to be associated with low 
risk. 
Alternative hypothesis 3C 
Hic: Out-performers of the control theory model tend to be associated with the banks 
that are larger in size. 
Null hypothesis 3C 
Ho (3C) : Out-performers of the control theory model tend not to be associated with the 
banks that are larger in size. 
Alternative hypothesis 3D 
H3D: Out-performers of the control theory model tend to be associated with the banks 
with a high dividend history. . 
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Null hypothesis 3D 
H0 (3D) : Out-performers of the control theory model tend not to be associated with the 
banks that have a high dividend history. 
Multiple regression and step wise regression analysis were applied to identify the 
characteristics associated with the out-performers of the control model. Details of the 
construction of the `Y' variable are presented in Chapter 7, Section 7.3. Table 4.4 
above identifies the `X' variables that were used by the multiple regression and step 
wise regression analysis to identify the characteristics of NYSE banks that out- 
perform the control model. Further discussions regarding the procedures carried and 
results attained in the final stage are detailed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
4.4.2 The results and conclusions of the research procedures 
The results of the procedures that are carried out in this study were collected and 
reported accordingly in Chapters 5,6 and 7. The conclusions of the research are 
established and presented in Chapter 8. 
4.5. The test for multicollinearity in the independent variables 
Prior to estimating the coefficients of the models, the sample data was tested for the 
existence of multicollinearity among the independent variables. Koop (2000) explains 
that multicollinearity exists when some or all of the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated with one another. Therefore, the regression model would have difficulty 
in 
explaining which explanatory variables are influencing the dependent variables. 
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Mendenhall and Sincich (1989) explain that, when serious multicollinearity is 
presented in regression analysis, it will increase the likelihood of rounding errors in 
the calculations of the estimates, and standard errors and hence the results reported 
may be misleading. 
`Statgraphics' is used to produce the correlation matrix that shows the correlations 
among the different independent variables. After deriving the correlation matrix, the 
final set of independent variables is established, as indicated in Table 4.5 below. 
The strongly related independent variables are found to be between: 
9 Return on capital employed & sales to capital employed; the return on capital 
employed ratio is selected, as a more comprehensive measure, 
9 Gearing ratio & debt ratio, and also leverage ratio & debt ratio; in this study 
only one variable is removed here, namely the debt ratio, 
0 Return on assets is found to be related to the total assets turnover ratio; the 
return on assets ratio is kept, since dividend in theory should be more strongly 
linked to profitability. 
The method suggested by Koop (2000) was used to eliminate related variables from 
the independent variable set. According to Koop (2000), to resolve the 
multicollinearity existence, at least one of the correlated variables should be selected 
and the other highly correlated variables should be removed from the regression. An 
alternative treatment which was not used in this study includes orthogonalisation, 
whereby two independent variables are separately regressed and one of which is 
removed but replaced by its residual in the original model. The Table 4.5 below 
shows the results of the correlation matrix for the independent variables that were 
finally accepted for this study. 
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Table 4.5 Results of the correlation matrix for the independent variables of this study 
Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Co! Col Col 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
debt gear lev div y payo RoE RoA RoCI rev g inc g div g cash Tob mtbv 
% Q 
Col2 *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd *vrrd 
debt 
Col 3 *vrrd 1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 
gear 126 210 237 484 880 722 121 931 304 152 018 612 
Col 4 *vrrd -0.2 1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 Lev 126 725 610 329 115 341 162 810 409 472 323 042 
Col 5 *vrrd 0.0 0.0 1 -0.4 -0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 div y 210 725 905 198 405 184 056 169 622 702 701 413 
Col 6 *vrrd 0.0 0.0 -0.4 1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
pa yo 237 610 905 039 763 380 689 177 262 221 056 616 
_ 
Col 7 *vrrd -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 
RoE 484 329 198 039 228 198 469 318 371 994 087 628 
Col 8 *vrrd 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
RoA 880 115 405 763 228 324 636 426 310 266 291 570 
Cot 9 *vrrd 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0 1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.2 -0.1 
RoCI 722 341 184 380 198 324 429 460 623 061 329 201 
C0110 *vrrd 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 
rev g 121 162 056 689 469 636 429 379 157 134 439 015 
Col 11 *vrrd 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 
inc g 931 810 169 177 318 426 460 379 340 146 331 360 
Cot 12 *vrrd 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 
div 304 409 622 262 371 310 623 157 340 187 842 553 
Col 13 *vrrd 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 
1 0.0 0.0 
cash % 152 472 702 221 994 266 061 134 146 187 632 416 
Col 14 *vrrd 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 
1 -0.2 
Tob Q 018 323 701 056 087 291 329 439 331 842 632 998 
Col 15 
mtbv 
*vrrd -0.2 
612 
-0.2 
042 
-0.0 
413 
0.0 
616 
-0.1 
628 
-0.0 
570 
-0.1 
201 
0.0 
015 
0.0 
360 
-0.0 
553 
0.0 
416 
-0.2 
998 
1 
' 
Col 16 
log 
*vrrd -0.0 
171 
-0.3 
315 
-0.1 
510 
0.0 
075 
-0.2 
652 
-0.0 
097 
-0.0 
221 
-0.1 
492 
0.0 
489 
-0.1 
074 
-0.0 
789 
-0.0 
214 
-0.0 
869 
emp 
* vrrd = variable removed from researcrn aata 
There are no correlations with absolute values greater than 0.5 amongst the above 
mentioned predictor variables. 
Col 
16 
log 
emp 
*vrrd 
-0.0 
171 
-0.3 
315 
-0.1 
150 
0.0 
075 
-0.2 
652 
-0.0 
097 
-0.0 
221 
-0.1 
492 
0.0 
489 
-0.1 
074 
-0.0 
789 
-0.0 214 
-0.0 
869 
1 
117 
Table 4.5 (b) The key for the above Table 4.5 
Columns on the correlation matrix Variable 
1 COI 2- debt 
*variable removed from research 
data *vrrd 
Debt ratio 
2 Cot 3- gear Gearing ratio 
3 Col 4- /ev Leverage ratio 
4 Col 5- divy Dividend yield 
5 Col 6- payo Dividend payout ratio 
6 Col 7- RoE Return on equity 
7 Col 8- RoA Return on assets 
8 Co! 9- Rocº Return on capital invested 
9 Cot 10 - rev g Revenue growth rate 
10 Col 11 - Incg Income growth rate 
11 Col 12 - divg Dividend growth rate 
12 Col 13 - cash % % of cash flow in share price 
13 Col 14 - rob Q Tobin's Q ratio 
14 Col 15 - mtbv Share price / book value of assets 
15 Cot 16 -log emp Log of the number of employees 
The absolute values of the correlations contained in Table 4.5 show that the 
independent variables that were selected for analysis by this study are sufficiently 
unrelated and appropriate. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has discussed the data, variables, research questions, hypotheses and 
research procedures used in this study. Further relevant information and results will 
be discussed and presented as necessary in the subsequent Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. 
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CHAPTER 5: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE CONTROL 
PLANNING HORIZONS ON DIVIDEND DETERMINATION 
5.1 Introduction 
The key objective of Chapter 5 is to investigate the impact of the control planning 
horizon, when determining dividends for US banking corporations. This chapter 
consists of the following sections: Section 5.2 specifies research procedures for the 
chapter; and Section 5.3 presents the results, which are discussed in Section 5.4 and 
to which the conclusions are presented in Section 5.5. 
5.2 The research procedures undertaken 
Chapter 5 of this thesis endeavours to investigate the impact of different control 
planning horizons when determining dividends for NYSE banking corporations. 
Therefore, the question being addressed in this section is: what planning horizon 
would enable the control theory framework to generate planned dividends close to 
those observed in practice? To answer the question, the following assumptions have 
been made for the initial phase of the study: 
9 the planning horizon (T) can include any number of periods. Therefore, T can 
be equal to 1 or T can be equal to 100, and so on. 
" to determine the liquid assets (Ao) for the control theory model, this study 
assumes that working capital figures can be substituted for the liquid assets 
(Ao) figures. Section 4.2.2.1 of this thesis explains how the working capital 
figures for banking corporations are estimated in this study. 
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" the weighting factor (b), which is an important construct in the model is initially 
assumed to take a value close to one. This assumes a distribution of all liquid 
assets to shareholders at the terminal point in the optimal control model. 
Therefore, at the terminal point, the weighting factor (b) is initially assumed in 
this study to enter the time horizon transversality condition with a value of 
about b=1, which makes the dividend issued at T (i. e. D(T)) equal to the 
terminal asset value A(T). Assuming the factor (b) to take a value close to one 
is appropriate and sensible for this particular research because of the following 
two main reasons: 
- firstly, at the terminal point sharing out all distributable assets to s 
shareholders makes good economic sence particularly to the 
organisation's shareholders; and 
- secondly, even if the b-values are much different from one, it will be 
demonstrated that the resultant planned dividends are not statistically 
significantly different at the 95 per cent confidence level. 
For this purpose, in order to obtain further relevant knowledge regarding the 
weighting factor (b) an analysis is conducted to compare the impact that 
different values of the factor `b' would have on planned observed dividends. 
Five values of the weighting factor `b' were identified and these included, 'b' = 
1 `b' = 2, `b' =3, `b' = 10 and `b' = other low value. To conduct the analysis the 
following procedures were carried out: 
- each selected b-value was programmed 
into the optimal control theory model 
to determine future dividends for each bank. 
-the five different sets of 
b-values successfully determined five sets of 
dividends. 
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- the five different sets of dividends that were determined were recorded 
accordingly and, using the Statgraphics plus version 5.1, analysed by a one 
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results of the one way analysis of 
variance are contained below in Table 5. They show that there is not a 
statistically significant difference between the dividends determined by the 
optimal control theory model for different b-values. So, the results confirm that 
the low b-values such as `b' = 1,2,3,10 or other low value, all tend to 
determine a similar dividend figure. 
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Table 5- ANOVA tests, which confirm indifferences among the different b-values 
The different statistics performed by the one- 
way analysis of variance 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Year 
4 
Year 
5 
Year 
6 
Mean of determined dividends 
b=1 1164 1532 1912 2313 2755 3267 
b=2 1154 1536 1927 2339 3815 3311 
b=3 1138 1522 1916 2329 3807 3304 
b=10 1092 1488 1891 2313 3782 3282 
b= other low value 1172 1550 1941 2350 3826 3320 
Standard Deviations of determined dividends 
b=1 2.201 2.462 3.001 1.210 1.576 2.079 
b=2 2.176 2.442 2.985 1.205 2.300 2.074 
b=3 2.158 2.428 2.975 1.203 2.299 2.073 
b=10 2.071 2.358 2.924 1.192 2.294 2.068 
b= other low value 2.196 2.458 2.997 1.208 2.301 2.076 
ANOVA 
F- Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
P- Value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 
Multiple Range Tests 
(paired comparisons not significant) 
1-2 10.413 -4.417 -14.871 -21.395 -105.944 -43.852 
1-3 26.402 9.025 -3.960 -16.449 -1.051.5 -36.437 
1-10 72.671 43.887 20.598 -0.919 -102.641 -15.111 
2-3 15.989 13.442 10.911 9.946 7.938 7.4152 
2-10 62.259 48.305 35.470 25.475 33.029 28.741 
3-10 46.270 34.863 24.559 15.529 25.092 21.326 
Other low value -1 7.682 18.817 28.913 
37.938 107.022 52.713 
Other low value -2 18.095 14.400 
14.042 11.543 10.781 8.862 
Other low value -3 34.084 27.842 
24.953 21.489 18.719 16.277 
Other low value - 10 80.353 
62.704 49.511 37.018 43.810 37.603 
Cochran's C test 
P- Value 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Kruskal - Wallis Test 
Test statistic 1.263 0.879 0.454 0.289 
0.219 0.124 
P- Value 0.868 0.928 0.978 0.991 0.994 0.998 
Summary: Results in Table 5 show that there are no statistically signitmcant ainerences 
between the dividends determined by different b-values. 
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After establishing the above assumptions, this study proceeds to complete the 
following four procedures detailed below, which enable this research to test the 
impact of the control planning horizon in determining dividends: 
5.2.1 First stage - Building spreadsheets containing control theory formulae 
At the first stage effective spreadsheets are designed that contain the control theory 
model formulae. The constructed spreadsheets determine the future dividends. 
Section 4.4.1.1 of this thesis summarises the work that was carried out in this 
research study to construct the Microsoft Excel spreadsheets containing optimal 
control theory formulae, which determine projected dividends for this study. 
5.2.2 Second stage - The number of spreadsheets constructed for each bank 
For each bank selected for this study many sets of spreadsheets are constructed as 
necessary to determine dividends. Normally around five different Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets were required to determine the control planning horizon of each bank. 
The different Excel spreadsheets were constructed by applying, some of the 
following different planning horizons to the control theory model: 
" T=1 
" T=6 
" T=18 
9 T=20 
" T=50 
" T=80 
" T=100 
9 T=150 
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" T=200. 
5.2.3 Third stage - Dividend determination phase (determining future 
dividends) 
The control theory elements, mentioned in Chapter 4, were entered onto the 
spreadsheets mentioned above in 5.2.2. 
When all the elements of the control theory are entered on to the constructed Excel 
spreadsheets, the control theory formulae contained within the spreadsheets are 
used to calculate the projected dividends for each bank. 
5.2.4 Fourth stage - Identifying the ideal control planning horizon for each bank 
The actual dividends paid out to shareholders were compared to the determined 
dividends for some of the following planning horizons: 
" 1=1 
" T=6 
9 T=18 
" T=20 
9 T=50 
" T=80 
9 T=100 
" T=150 
" T=200 
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The difference between the actual dividends paid out to shareholders and the 
dividends determined by the control theory model produces a figure which this 
research study has called a dividend divergence figure [DDF]. 
Therefore: 
determined dividend less actual dividend paid 
dividend divergence figure [DDF] 
Secondly and finally: the dividend divergence figure [DDF] is expressed here as a 
percentage of the actual dividend and is then called the Dividend Divergence Rate. 
Therefore, the formula below calculates the dividend divergence rate (DDR): 
(DDF / Actual dividends) x 100 = DDR 
So, the dividend divergence rate [DDR] is the extent to which the determined 
dividends diverge from actual dividends paid. 
5.2.5 Method used to establish results for this research 
The following methods below have been applied to this research study to determine 
the results presented in Tables 5.1,5.2 and 5.3. 
5.2.5.1 Determining the ideal control planning horizon (T) for the control model 
The control planning horizon (T), that produces the lowest dividend divergence rate 
(DDR) for each bank, is selected as the ideal control planning horizon for each bank. 
Table 5(a) below contains an example, detailing how the dividend divergence rate 
(DDR) is determined in this study. 
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5.2.5.2 Method used to establish the cut-off point which identifies the NYSE 
banks with control-theoretic dividends 
The details explaining the method used by this research to establish the cut-off point, 
which identifies the NYSE banks with control-theoretic dividends is presented below. 
Firstly, The average DDR (dividend divergence rate) for all the banks in the regional 
group is determined and then the standard deviation for the DDRs for all the banks in 
the regional group is established next. An example is contained in Table 5(b) below. 
Secondly: Outliers were identified and eliminated from the cut-off calculations. To 
establish outliers in this study, the following example provides a clear explanation: 
" The average values for DDRs was established as shown in Table 5(b): 
Average regional DDR = 111 
0 The standard deviation for the DDRs was also established as shown in Table 
5(b) : High regional DDR Std Deviation = 163 % 
0 The value for two standard deviations was determined, as follows : 
163 %+ 163 %+ 111 %= 437 % 
9 Any DDR from the USA Money centre banks which was above 437% was 
eliminated from the cut-off calculations. 
Thirdly: A new average DDR is then calculated after eliminating all the outliers. 
In this example, the new average DDR is 105 
Fourthly: The cut-off is identified for the control-theoretic dividends. 
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The DDR of 105 % is the cut-off point for the Money Centre banks. Any DDR for the 
Money Centre banks, which is below 105% (DDR<105%), is regarded as the value 
that identifies the banks with control-theoretic dividends. 
Finally, any bank with a DDR > 105% is regarded in this study as not possessing 
control-theoretic dividends under the research assumptions stipulated in Section 5.2 
above. 
The procedures explained above, here in Section 5.2.5.2, for identifying banks with 
control-theoretic dividends were applied to all the other regional groups named in 
Table 4.3, and the results attained by this study for Chapter 5 are contained in 
Section 5.3 below. 
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5.3 Results 
The initial results of this research contained in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below answer the 
first research question of this study given above in Sections 4.4.1.1 and 5.2. The 
findings revealed in Table 5.1 show that there exists an ideal control planning horizon 
for NYSE banking corporations, which matches observed dividends. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that higher control planning horizons tend to perform 
better. Table 5.2 shows that the popular ideal control planning horizon for all regional 
groups is T=100. By contrast, only a very small number of the banks showed that a 
low planning horizon determines observed dividends. 
Table 5.3 below discloses whether a region contains a high proportion of banks 
whose dividend behaviour exhibits a control-theoretic pattern. 
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5.4 Discussion of Results 
The following are some facts that summaries the key findings of chapter 5. 
With regards to the NYSE banks with 
control-theoretic dividends each bank 
had a unique control planning horizon 
which enabled the control theory 
framework to model observed 
dividends. 
" The higher control planning horizons 
tended to be most popular in modelling 
observed dividends. 
" With regards to the NYSE banks with 
control-theoretic dividends very few 
banks had low unique control planning 
horizons which enabled the control 
theory framework to model observed 
dividends. 
" T=100 is the most popular control 
planning horizon that enabled the 
control theory framework to model 
observed dividends. 
" Some NYSE banks have control- 
theoretic dividends under the 
research assumptions, contained in 
Section 5.2 above. 
" Some NYSE banks do not have 
control-theoretic dividends under the 
research assumptions, contained in 
Section 5.2 above. 
The results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that a high control planning horizon 
possesses a greater chance of modelling observed dividends when applied to the 
optimal control theory framework within the reseach assumptions stated in section 
5.2. 
Applying a high control planning horizon, such as T=100, to the optimal control 
theory model seems to support the accounting going concern and continuity 
conventions that state that unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, 
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organisations should plan business decisions with the assumption that the entity will 
continue in business more or less indefinitely. Therefore, the results of Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 mentioned above could also suggest that the optimal control theory model for 
dividend determination has a long term planning contingent / provision built within it. 
Literature on business management studies encourages long term planning [see, for 
example, Berry (2000) and Hankin, Seidner and Zietlow (1998)]. The optimal control 
theory model seems to cater for the long term provision well, which is good. 
Results of this research study, contained in Table 5.3, suggest that some NYSE 
banks have control-theoretic dividends and other NYSE banks do not have control- 
theoretic dividend patterns. 
In the next chapter, the focus will be upon the financial characteristics of those 
banking corporations classified by this study as having control-theoretic dividends. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Alternative control planning horizons were evaluated in terms of their impact upon the 
divergence between dividends determined by the control model and actual dividends. 
The optimal planning horizon was then determined (see section 5.2.5). There was a 
preponderance of very long optimal planning horizons. Outlier divergences were 
eliminated. Most of the foreign banks typically did not have control-theoretic 
dividends. In Chapter 6 the focus will be upon determining the factors that are 
associated with the banks that have control-theoretic dividends. 
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CHAPTER 6: IDENTIFYING THE FACTORS THAT GOVERN NYSE BANKS WITH 
CONTROL- THEORETIC DIVIDENDS 
6.1 Introduction 
The key objective of this chapter is to identify the factors that govern NYSE banks 
with control-theoretic dividends. This chapter consists of the following: Section 6.2 
specifies the procedures used in this thesis to achieve the objectives of the chapter. 
Section 6.3 presents the results of the chapter. The results of this chapter are 
discussed in Section 6.4 and finally conclusions are given in Section 6.5. 
6.2 The procedures undertaken to identify the characteristics of NYSE banks 
with control-theoretic dividends 
Having identified in Chapter 5 above the NYSE banks with control-theoretic 
dividends, this chapter endeavours to establish the key factors that are associated 
with such banks. 
Past research has successfully identified some factors that influence dividend 
policy in organisations, and these factors are used here to test hypothesised 
characteristics of the banks with control-theoretic dividends. Section 4.4.1.2 above 
has clearly stated the key hypotheses being tested and the research question being 
answered here in Chapter 6. 
The following procedures were undertaken by this investigative research to identify 
the factors that govern the banks with control-theoratic dividends: 
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Stages 1 and 2 involved the collection of two types of relevant information for all the 
banks in the research sample. In Stage 1, the first type of information that was 
collected for each bank was the dependent variable (Y variable) for each bank. The 
dependent variable was the dividend divergence rate as explained below. 
The method used to create the Y variable for this study 
Initially, the actual dividends paid out to shareholders were compared with the control- 
theoretic dividends using various control planning horizons: 
9 T=1 
" T=6 
T=18 
9 T=20 
" T=50 
" T=80 
" T=100 
" T=150 
" T=200 
The difference between the actual dividends paid out to shareholders and the 
dividends determined by the control theo model produces a figure which in this 
thesis is called a Dividend Divergence Figure [DDF]. 
Therefore: 
Determined dividend less Actual dividend paid = Dividend Divergence Figure 
[DDF] 
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Secondly and finally: the dividend divergence figure [DDF] is expressed as a 
percentage of the actual dividend and is then called the Dividend Divergence Rate. 
Therefore the formula below calculates the dividend divergence rate (DDR) as: 
(DDF f Actual dividends) x 100 = DDR 
Stage 2: 
The second set of information collected for each bank included the independent 
variables, as listed in Table 4.4. 
Stages 3: 
The collected information for all the relevant banks was entered onto a single 
spreadsheet to make up a single group. 
Stage 4: 
The information contained on the above mentioned spreadsheet was divided into two 
distinct groups. 
The first group was made up of the banks that have control-theoretic dividends and 
such banks make up the statistics reported in Table 5.3 above. By contrast, the 
second group only contained the banks that were identified in Chapter 5 above as not 
having control-theoretic dividends. 
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Stage 5: 
For the dependent variable (Y variable) of the first group of data the binary value 1 
was used. The dependent variable for the second set of data was number 0. 
Stage 6: 
The above mentioned two groups containing the ones and zeros were merged back 
to form one group again. 
Stage 7: 
The above mentioned single group was copied and pasted onto a file from a 
computer package called Statgraphics plus version 5.1. The logistic regression 
analysis and logistic stepwise regression analysis were applied to identify the factors 
that govern the banks with control-theoratic dividends. 
6.3 Results 
As indicated by the low likelihood ratio p-values, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 identify the 
following as factors that typify the banks with control-theoretic dividends: 
" high dividend yield 
" high leverage 
" high return on capital invested 
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" high Tobin's Q ratio. 
Possessing a small number of employees is identified by Table 6.1 as being another 
key factor that is associated with banks that have control-theoretic dividend patterns. 
Each of these factors is significant at the 99 per sent confidence level. Table 6.2 
reveals that certain regional groupings greatly influence the characteristics of banks 
with control-theoretic dividends. In particular, certain groupings are peculiar. So, the 
affiliation into: 
9 the foreign banks listed on the NYSE, 
9 the USA Mid-Atlantic, and 
0 the USA Pacific regional banks 
have a critical influence on identifying the characteristics of banks with control- 
theoretic dividends. The foreign banks and the Mid-Atlantic banks do not in general 
have control-theoretic dividends. However, the Pacific regional banks tend to possess 
control-theoretic dividends. 
The logistic regression analysis produced the following equation: 
lOg [p / (1-p)J = ßo + ßI XI + lß2 X2 + ... + ßn Xn +E 
(An example can be found in Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999)) 
where p= probability of `success' (i. e. control-theoretic) 
1-p = probability of `failure' (i. e. not control-theoretic) 
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ßo, ßi, 
.., 
An = coefficients 
X1, i(2, 
,,. , 
X = independent variables 
E= error term. 
The logistic regression analysis in this study produced the following equation: 
In {pi (1-p)} = -1.01154 + 0.0219257*Col 4+0.261964*CoI 5+0.200033*Col 9+ 
3.66953*Col 14 + 0.295728*Col 16 
which can be re-written as: 
In {p/ (1-p)} = -1.01154 + 0.0219257*Leverage ratio + 0.261964*Dividend yield + 
0.200033*Return on capital invested + 3.66953*Tobin's Q ratio + 0.295728* Log of 
number of employees. 
It follows that the probability of a bank to exhibit a control-theoretic dividend pattern is 
related to the independent variables as follows: 
p= ex o+ ß1 X1 + ß2 X2 + ... 
+ ßn Xn ) 
1+ exp (N0 + N1 
X1+J62X2+... + ßn Xn ) 
The above mentioned equation identifies banking corporations that possess the 
capability of applying the control theory model for dividend determination. 
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Table 6.3 displays that a cut off point of 0.5 maximises the total percentage of correct 
predictions. 
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The conclusion for Table 6.1: 
Since the chi-square goodness of fit test has a P-value of 0.119 > 0.05, there is no 
reason to reject the adequacy of the fitted model at the 95% confidence level. 
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The conclusion for Table 6.2: 
Since Chi-square goodness of fit test, P-value is 0.174 > 0.05, there is no reason to 
reject the adequacy of the fitted model at 95% confidence level. 
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6.4 Discussion of results 
As mentioned in Section 6.2 above, the application of the logistic regression analysis 
and step-wise regression procedure established the factors listed in Diagram 6.4 
below as the factors that govern the fitness of the optimal control theory model in 
dividend determination. The nature of the different relationships is also shown in 
Diagram 6.4. 
Diagram 6.4 Factors that govern banks with control-theoretic dividends 
Leverage Ratios 
Dividend Yield Ratios 
Critical factors 
I associated with Return on Capital Invested banks with 
control-theoretic 
dividends 
Tobin's Q Ratio 
+ 
Employee size 
In summary, taking into consideration the above results contained in Diagram 6.4, the 
optimal control theory model tends to associated with small (by employee size) NYSE 
banks, which perform financially well and possess a strong share price, as indicated 
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by the high Tobin's Q ratio, higher dividend yield, a greater return on capital invested, 
and a higher leverage. 
Considering further the factors identified in Diagram 6.4 above, the results of this 
study reveal that the potential contenders that are likely to be applicable to apply the 
optimal control theory tend to be associated with: 
" Higher leverage ratio = (Total debt / shareholder's equity); and higher leverage 
ratios tend to be associated with banks that have high customer confidence. 
This is evidenced in this study by the high leverage figures (a combined short 
term and long term debt measure), implying for banks typically high short term 
debt in the leverage figures, i. e. high customer deposits, which reflects high 
customer confidence and hence shows that the bank is doing well. 
For banking corporations, the leverage calculations include customer deposits 
in the total debt figures, and hence resulting in the above mentioned higher 
leverage figures. A good example in the UK during 2007 was the Northern 
Rock case which clearly exposed that, when customers' confidence in a bank 
is lost, customers tend to withdraw their deposits from the bank. Therefore, a 
bank with high deposits would tend to reflect that the bank customers are 
comfortable with the bank's safeguarding their deposits, hence reflecting the 
customers' confidence. 
A high financial leverage ratio would otherwise normally indicate a substantial 
proportion of debt financing the business; this could be the norm particularly in 
other industries. In itself it would indicate high risk, but in the banking industry 
higher leverage does not in itself indicate risk as explained above. 
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9 The high dividend yield stated above reveals that the control theory model fits 
well in banking corporations that issue a high dividend to price figure for each 
share. The high dividend yield figure is normally associated with banking 
corporations that perform well in the economic environment and present 
opportunities to engage in value investing (see the high return on capital 
invested). 
In other instances a high dividend yield could signal the following: 
- that stock prices are rapidly declining (low share prices) and 
- that there is not room for further dividend increases or possibly in the 
extreme there could be dividend cuts. This scenario is less preferred by 
investors who want a steady dividend increase to indicate that the 
business is healthy enough over periods of time to return cash to 
shareholders. 
This is not the case in this particular study, because the high Tobin's Q ratio 
reveals that the banks possess high share prices, compared with book values, 
therefore indicating that the banks perform effectively in the market place. 
" The high return on capital invested mentioned above shows that the 
banks 
with control-theoretic dividends tend to possess high net profitability that 
is 
generated by the bank's investments. The high return on capital invested ratios 
are associated with healthy banking corporations that are performing 
successfully and that use the customers' funds profitably. 
152 
" The banking corporations with a small number of employees are mostly 
associated with the small banks. 
9 The Tobin's Q ratio = 
[Total market value of the organisation (according to price traders) / 
Current cost of replacing the company's existing assets] 
The Tobin's Q ratio is a ratio of the total market value of the company against the 
current cost of replacing the firm's existing assets. A high Tobin's Q ratio occurs when 
a firm's market value is high relative to the asset replacement cost. As mentioned 
above, this implies that the shares of the control-theoretic banks are highly valued. 
The high Tobin's Q ratio indicates that these banks tend to be expanding banking 
corporations (or have high growth potential), making active investment decisions and 
possibly possessing high unrecorded goodwill, suggesting a relatively low book value. 
Table 6.2 above reveals that the foreign banks listed on the NYSE, USA Mid- 
Atlantic and the USA Pacific regional banks have a critical influence on identifying the 
factors that govern the banks with control-theoretic dividends. The foreign banks and 
the USA Mid-Atlantic banks in general do not have control-theoretic dividends. But, 
most USA banking corporations, especially the Pacific regional banks, have control- 
theoretic dividend patterns. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 6 answers the second key research question which endeavours to 
investigate and identify the factors that are associated with banks that display control- 
theoretic dividend patterns. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 detail the main factors that govern the 
fitness of the optimal control theory model. An analysis of the results suggests that 
the small healthy USA banking corporations which possess signs and evidence of 
paying good dividends to shareholders and that are successful and growing tend to 
describe the banks with control-theoretic dividends. 
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CHAPTER 7: IDENTIFYING THE FACTORS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH 
BANKS THAT OUT- PERFORM THE CONTROL THEORY FRAMEWORK 
7.1 Introduction 
The key objective of Chapter 7 is to identify the main dividend policy factors that are 
associated with the out-performers of the optimal control theory model. The 
procedures employed to identify the factors that are associated with the out- 
performing banks are detailed in Section 7.2 below. Section 7.3 presents the results 
of the chapter. While Section 7.4, discusses the results, and finally Section 7.5 
conclusions the chapter. 
7.2 The procedures applied to identify the factors that are associated with the 
out-performers of the optimal control theory model 
The key research question being answered in the final phase of the study is given 
above in Section 4.4.1.3. The dividend policy factors that are examined in this part of 
the study are the factors that the literature has identified as influencing dividend 
policies in organisations (see Table 4.4 above). 
To achieve the objectives of this chapter, this study made some research 
assumptions, which are explained in Chapter 5 above (see Section 5.2). Details of the 
hypotheses that are tested in the final phase of the study are presented in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.1.3. Given below are the four procedures that were conducted for 
Chapter 7: 
I ýs 
Stage 1: 
This stage involved identifying all the NYSE banks that constitute the research 
sample and recording them onto a spreadsheet. 
Stage 2: 
The following two categories of information were collected for each bank mentioned 
above: 
9 The first set of information collected includes the independent variables (X 
variables) given in Table 4.4. 
The second set of information needed for each bank was the appropriate dependent 
variable (Y variable), The dependent variable for each bank was created by using the 
process explained above in Sections 5.2.4 and 6.2 to establish the dividend 
divergence rate (DDR). 
Control- 
theoretic 
dividend 
rate 
LESS Actual dividend 
rate of NYSE 
banks 
DDR 
(negative for out- 
performers; 
positive for under- 
performers) 
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Stage 3: 
The above mentioned two groups of data: 
" the Y variables and 
9 the X variables, 
for each bank were entered accordingly onto a single spreadsheet to form one data 
set. 
Stage 4: 
The above mentioned single data set produced was up-loaded onto Statgraphics plus 
version 5.1, and the multiple regression analysis and multiple stepwise regression 
analysis were applied to identify the factors that are related to the out-performers of 
the control theory framework (out-performing banks of the control theory framework 
have actual dividends that are higher than the control-theoretic dividends). 
7.3 Results 
Table 7.1 below exhibits the results of the final multiple step-wise regression analysis, 
which provides the information regarding the factors associated with DDR (negative 
for outperformers, and positive for underperformers). 
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Initially all the appropriate variables of the NYSE banks that constitute the whole 
research sample were included in a full multiple regression and which included dummy 
variables for every region except one. All dummy variables could not be included 
simultaneously because of linear dependence. The insignificant variables were removed 
through step-wise regression and the relevant dummy variables were also removed as 
required by the step-wise regression analysis. 
Summary of the factors that characterise the out-performers of the control theory 
framework: 
1. higher dividend yield ratio, 
2. higher return on equity ratio, 
3. higher revenue growth ratio, 
4. lower Tobin's Q ratio 
5. lower dividend payout ratio, 
6. lower income growth ratio, and 
7. lower size of employees. 
(Vice versa for under-performers) 
I () 
7.4 Discussion of results 
Diagram 7.4 below shows the nature of the relationships that exists among the factors 
that tend to be associated with out-performing banks. 
Diagram 7.4: Relationships of the factors that are associated with the out-performers of 
the control theory model 
dividend yield ýý 
return on equity %-.,, 
revenue growth 
+ 
+ 
E Tobin's Q 
dividend payout 
income growth 
size of employees 
ý, 
- 
Characteristics 
of 
out performers 
of 
the control 
model 
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It is important to appreciate that the factors identified in Chapter 6 as governing the 
NYSE banks with control-theoretic dividends also apply to the group of banks that are 
classified here in Chapter 7, as the out-performers of the control theory model. In 
addition to the factors identified on Diagram 6.4 as being associated to the banks with 
control-theoretic dividends, the out-performers of the control theory framework possess 
the following: higher dividend yield, higher return on equity, higher revenue growth, lower 
dividend payout, lower Tobin's Q, lower income growth and smaller employee size. 
Discussing the results of the out-performers in more detail; the higher return on equity 
and the higher revenue growth ratios show that out-performers tend to attain higher 
profits from the equity capital raised from shareholders and also have an implied growing 
customer base. 
The Tobin's Q ratio compares the market value of the company to the current cost of 
replacing the firm's existing assets. A lower Tobin's Q value, as is the case here, implies 
that lower growth potential for the future. 
Chapter 6 mentions that higher dividend yield figures may mean that the stock price 
is relatively low and this may present opportunities for investors to engage in value 
investing activities. However, the profitability is higher, so this is unlikely to be the case. 
Diagram 7.5 indicates a healthy state of affairs for out-performers through the higher 
revenue growth rate and the higher return on equity, although there is a lower income 
growth rates. Traditionally, high dividend yields are associated with leading firms in 
mature industries, which can afford to payout high dividends. Indeed here the payout 
ratios are smaller for the out-performers. Out-performers here are smaller in size, and 
more profitable. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
A number of dividend policy determinants presented in Table 4.4 were subjected to the 
multiple regression analysis and step-wise regression analysis accordingly to identify the 
factors associated with NYSE banks that out-perform the control theory framework. 
The results reveal that out-performing banks: 
9 have higher profits, as indicated by the higher return on equity, and an implied 
expanding customer base, as suggested by the higher revenue growth rate; 
9 have higher dividend yields, constrained by an implied internally imposed 
conservative retention policy, as indicated by lower payout ratios; 
0 tend to be smaller in size. 
The focus in the next final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 8, is to present the thesis' 
conclusions and to lay out the direction of future research arising from this study. 
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CHAPTER 8 THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTION OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 has three key objectives: to present the overall findings of this research 
study, to discuss the limitations of this study, and to suggest the direction of future 
research. 
Chapter 8 contains the following different sections: Section 8.2 summarises the 
main purpose of this study and the fundamental issues investigated by this study. 
Section 8.3 details the overall findings of this study, Section 8.4 presents the 
limitations of this research, Section 8.5 provides the direction of future research and 
finally Section 8.6 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 The main purpose of this research and key issues investigated by this study 
The main purpose of this research was to investigate the dividend behaviour of NYSE 
banks within the optimal control theory framework. This study investigated the 
dividends of NYSE banking corporations in three stages as follows: 
" The first stage carried out investigations on the initial research idea which was 
developed following Davidson's (1980) suggestion which states that the infinite 
horizon model and hence the long planning (T=100 ) horizon model are not 
likely to be good explanators of observed behaviour. The initial stage of this 
research establishes the control planning horizons that determine the control- 
theoretic dividend patterns for the NYSE banks successfully. The initial 
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hypotheses and the work carried in the initial stage are presented in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.1.1 and Chapter 5. 
9 Stage two utilised some relevant results attained in stage one to identify the 
factors that govern control-theoretic dividend patterns. Details of the 
procedures carried in the second stage and the associated hypotheses 
applicable to stage two are detailed accordingly in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1.2 
and Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
9 Finally, stage three followed on after attaining the results of stage one and 
stage two. The third phase managed to identify the factors that are related to 
the out-performers of the control theory framework. The out-performers of the 
control theory model are determined by the procedure presented in Chapter 7, 
Section 7.2. The relevant hypotheses tested in the final stage are given in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1.3. 
8.3 Summary of the research findings 
The results of this research project reveal the following: 
8.3.1. Stage one results 
There exists an optimal control planning horizon for each banking corporation, which 
enables the determination of optimal dividends for each particular organisation. 
Therefore, a NYSE banking corporation would have to identify a unique specific 
control planning horizon, ideal to suit the bank's particular circumstances, when 
determining the control-theoretic dividend patterns for the bank. 
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Results also revealed that some NYSE banks have actual dividend patterns similar to 
control-theory dividend patterns. Other NYSE banks do not have actual dividends 
being similar to the control-theoretic dividend patterns. Therefore, some banking 
corporations listed on the NYSE are able to use the optimal control theory model for 
dividend determination, while other banks are unable to apply the optimal control 
theory. 
Results suggest that this study should reject alternative hypothesis 1 (H1), which 
states that low finite control planning horizons determine the level of dividends, of 
NYSE banking corporations, and must not reject the first null hypothesis (Ho(1)) , 
because the research findings confirm that high finite control planning horizons, such 
as T= 100, tend to determine the control-theoretic dividend patterns. 
This study further exposed that with regards to banks listed on the NYSE, the 
foreign banks listed on the stock market, the USA Mid-Atlantic and the USA Pacific 
regional banks have a critical influence in identifying whether banks possessed 
control-theoretic dividend patterns or not. The foreign banks and the Mid-Atlantic 
banks in general contained banks that did not possess control-theoretic dividends. 
The Pacific regional banks do, however, possess a high number of banks with 
control-theoretic dividend patterns. 
8.3.2. Stage two results 
Results of this study suggest that the control-theoretic dividend patterns are likely to 
be associated with NYSE banks that are small in size, perform financially well, 
perform well on the stock market by possessing a very strong share price, possess 
high investment potential, pay significant dividends to shareholders, and finally are 
financed significantly by relatively large amounts of debt in relation to equity capital. 
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The research results indicate that the propensity of a NYSE bank to possess control- 
theoretic dividend patterns is governed by the following relationships: 
higher leverage (as shown by a positive relationship between the leverage 
ratio and the control-theoretic dividend pattern variable, which is a `1' in the 
logistic regression analysis), 
9 higher dividend yield (as shown by a positive relationship between dividend 
yield ratio and control-theoretic dividend pattern variable). 
"a greater return on capital invested (as shown by a positive relationship 
between return on capital invested ratio and control-theoretic dividend pattern 
variable). 
"a higher Tobin's Q (as shown by a positive relationship between Tobin's Q 
ratio and control-theoretic dividend pattern variable), and 
"a smaller number of bank employees (as indicated by a negative relationship 
between the bank size variable and control-theoretic dividend pattern variable) 
While on the other hand dividend policy literature identified the following as factors 
that influence dividend policy in corporations: 
" lower investment (indicated by a negative relationship of dividend yield 
(dividend policy) with investment opportunities) 
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" lower risk (indicated by a negative relationship of dividend yield with risk 
factors) 
9 lower insider ownership (indicated by a negative relationship between dividend 
policy with insider ownerships) 
9 large bank sizes (indicated by a positive relationship between dividend yield 
with size of the bank) 
" higher dividend history (indicated by a positive relationship between dividend 
yield with dividend history). 
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Table 8.3.2: Results of the relationship that exists between the factors that govern 
control-theoretic dividend patterns and the factors identified in the literature as 
influencing corporate dividend policy 
Factors that literature Factors that govern Are 
has found as influencing control-theoretic dividend factors the 
Alternative Null 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Do 
dividend policies in patterns in NYSE banks same? Do not reject not reject 
corporations (Accept) or (Accept) or do 
do not not accept 
accept 
A higher Tobin's Q and a 
hypothesis null 
1 lower investment greater return on capital x H2A_ do not hypothesis 
accept Ho(2A)_ Do not 
invested (indicating high reject 
(Accept) 
growth potential for 
investment oportunities) 
less diversified, focused 
hypothesis null 
2 lower risk and low risk H2B _ 
Do not hypothesis 
reject Ho(2B)_ do not 
(Accept) accept 
null 
hypothesis hypothesis 
3 large bank sizes small bank sizes x H2C _ 
do not HO(2C) -Do not 
accept reject 
(Accept) 
hypothesis null 
4 Higher historic dividend high dividend yield H2D _ 
Do not hypothesis 
reject Ho(2D)_ do not 
(Accept) accept 
lower insider ownership variable Not included in - - - 
5 the study 
variable not applicable 
6 to dividend policy Higher leverage - 
literature 
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The results contained in Table 8.3.2 show that this study should not reject the 
following hypotheses: 
" hypothesis H2B , which suggests that an association exists between the 
control-theoretic dividend patterns and low risk, and 
" hypothesis H2D, which suggests that an association exists between the 
control-theoretic dividend patterns and possessing a history of high dividends. 
This study should also not reject the following null hypotheses: 
" null hypothesis Ho (2A) , which suggests that no association exists between the 
control-theoretic dividend patterns and low investment, and 
" null hypothesis Ho (2\C), which suggests that no association exists between the 
control-theoretic dividend patterns and being a large bank. 
This study, therefore, suggests that with regards to NYSE banking corporations, the 
presence of the factors that literature identifies as influencing corporation dividend 
policies do not necessarily govern the control-theoretic dividend patterns in NYSE 
banks, but instead other relevant variables, such as a higher leverage, higher 
investment potential and small bank size also tend to be associated with the control- 
theoretic dividend patterns. 
8.3.3. Stage three results 
The out-performers of the optimal control theory framework tend to possess the 
following characteristics: 
9a higher dividend yield, 
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"a higher return on equity, 
"a higher revenue growth rate, 
"a lower dividend payout ratio, 
"a lower Tobin Q ratio, 
"a lower income growth, 
9a higher return on equity, and 
9a smaller employee size. 
The above mentioned factors simply suggest that out-performers of the control theory 
framework are associated with banks that have higher profits, as indicated by the 
higher return on equity, and an implied expanding customer base, as suggested by 
the higher revenue growth rate. Out-perfoming banks also have higher dividend 
yields, constrained by an implied internally imposed conservative retention policy, as 
indicated by lower payout ratios, and they tend to be smaller in size. 
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Table 8.3.3: Results of the relationship that exists between the out-performers of the 
control theory framework and the factors identified in the literature as influencing 
corporate dividend policy 
Factors that literature Factors that govern Alternative 
has found as control-theoratic dividend 
Are Hypothesis Null 
factors Do not reject Hypothesis 
influencing dividend patterns in NYSE banks the (Accept) or Do not reject 
policies in same? do not (Accept) or do 
corporations accept not accept 
lower investment a lower Tobin's Q and a 
hypothesis 
H3A 
_ 
Do not 
null 
hypothesis 
high return on equity ( reject Ho(3A)_do not 
indicating high profits 
(Accept) accept 
being made but lower 
investment opportunities ) 
2 lower risk highly diversified and x 
hypothesis 
H3B 
_ 
do not 
null 
hypothesis 
high risk accept Ho(3B) _ 
Do not 
reject 
(Accept) 
3 large bank sizes smaller bank (employee) X 
hypothesis 
H3C 
_ 
do not 
null 
hypothesis 
sizes accept Ho(3c) - 
Do not 
reject 
(Accept) 
4 higher dividend higher dividend yields 
hypothesis 
H3D 
_ 
Do not 
null 
hypothesis 
history reject Ho(3D) -do not (Accept) accept 
5 lower insider variable not included in - - - 
ownership the study 
variable not 
6 lower income growth ratio - - - applicable to dividend 
policy literature 
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Table 8.3.3 shows that this study should not reject hypothesis H3A which suggests an 
association between out-performers and lower investment opportunities. This 
research should also not reject hypothesis H3D which suggests an association 
between out-performers and a history of higher dividends. 
This study should also not reject the following null hypotheses: 
" null hypothesis Ho (3B) , which suggests that out-performing banks do not 
possess low risk, and 
0 null hypothesis Ho (3c), which suggests that out-performing banks are not large, 
This study suggests that with regards to NYSE banking corporations additional 
factors such as lower dividend payout ratios and lower income growth also tend to be 
associated with out-performing banks. The other variables which were identified as 
being part of the dividend policy literature but not associated with out-performers 
include lower risk and larger bank sizes. This indicates a slight discrepancy between 
the dividend policy literature and the findings of this research study. 
8.3.4. Further implications of dividend policy literature on this study 
The dividend policy literature confirmed that dividend policy is relevant to financial 
management mainly because it has a significant impact on company share valuation 
and cost of capital calculations, and cost of capital affects the capital investment 
decision of the organisation and the economic growth of the economy. 
Past research on dividend policy has been greatly useful to this study because the 
factors that have been identified in literature as influencing dividend policy have been 
utilised to constitute the required key elements that were tested in this study. 
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Chapter 2 identified the key challenges presented in the literature that confront the 
dividend puzzle matters. In support of Davidson (2002), this study emphasises the 
need for future dividend policy research which strives towards developing a unified 
rationalised corporate dividend policy, as a number of current different theories on 
corporate dividend policy are logical but completely disjointed. More work aimed at 
unifying dividend policy theory would be absolutely essential to company policy 
makers who are operating in this complex modern economic environment, who also 
tend to constantly seek any useful guidance from literature when they devise 
corporate policies. 
8.4 The limitations of this research 
This research was specifically limited to a sample of banking corporations which 
happened to be performing well on the stock market and that have issued dividends 
over the past years. This study might be difficult for struggling organisations that have 
never been able to issue out dividends in the past years. Therefore, it is a weakness 
of this study that it may not be suitable to all corporations. 
This research is limited to NYSE banking corporations only; other banking 
corporations listed in other countries should be examined in the future to establish if 
similar results are attained when the optimal control theory framework is applied to 
determine future dividends for the corporations. 
To identify factors that are associated with the banks that possess control-theoretic 
dividend patterns, the logistic regression analysis methodology was applied as it is an 
effective and efficient way of determining the required factors. It is the weakness of 
this research project that it did not explore other current research methodologies that 
could have produced similar results to the results produced by the logistic regression 
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analysis. For example, the probabilistic or multi-layer feed forward nets research 
methodologies could have been explored to establish their effectiveness and 
efficiency in identifying the key factors. Perhaps future research could utilise the 
above mentioned methodologies and establish their usefulness in identifying the 
required factors. 
8.5 The direction for future research 
The following are the recommended future research areas: 
" It would be great to investigate the behaviour of the optimal control theory in 
other major active stock markets in the world such as Tokyo, London and 
German stock markets. Making relevant comparisons between the results of 
different stock markets would be worthwhile. These future tests should not be 
limited to the banking corporations only, but should extend to other industrial 
sectors listed on stock markets. 
" The optimal control theory framework presented by Davidson (1980) has the 
abilities to determine concurrently, future dividend levels and future liquid asset 
levels. This research only considered the behaviour of the future dividend 
levels, and did not consider the behaviour of the future liquid asset levels. 
Future empirical research needs to observe also the behaviour of the liquidity 
levels, mentioned above. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
This study has managed to enhance the knowledge of an optimal control theory 
framework when the control framework is applied in practice. The findings of this 
study significantly contribute to current literature, as this research clearly established 
that the specific NYSE banking corporations possess control-theoretic dividend 
patterns described above in Chapters 5 and 6. Undoubtedly Chapter 7 successfully 
exposed the key characteristics of the NYSE banks with observed dividends that out- 
perform the dividends determined by the optimal control theory framework. 
Chapter 8 wraps up this thesis by suggesting weaknesses that should be 
considered in the future. Future research is very important as it will form an essential 
extension to this thesis which will further enhance the current knowledge of the 
optimal control theory framework for dividend determination. 
Future empirical work is vital for further knowledge generation in this area; 
therefore researchers are encouraged to continue active research in this subject 
matter of dividend determination. 
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Appendix 1- Procedure followed by this study to calculate the cost of capital 
The following is the procedure that this research followed to obtain the cost of capital 
for this study: 
Step 1: 
Firstly, this study collected the USA Risk Free Rate (to estimate the risk free rates the 
USA ten year government bonds were used by this study as the estimate) 
The source for the USA ten year government bonds was: The Financial Times news 
paper of Thursday, January 26 2006, the market date column. 
An example of the US risk free rates collected by this study are contained in 
Table AlA. This is abbreviated as RF and is given as a percentage (%) in Table AlA. 
Step 2: 
Secondly, this study collected the systematic risk values (the Beta values) for each 
bank in the sample. The source of the systematic risk, Beta values were from the 
information published by ADVFN. The systematic risk values are abbreviated as ß in 
the given Table AlA. 
Step 3: 
Thirdly, this study collected the risk premium figures. Risk premium is equal to market 
rate less risk free rate (RM - RF). The estimates of the risk premium were obtained 
from the results of the research study carried out by Omran and Pointon (2003). The 
risk premium estimates that were obtained by Omran and Pointon (2003) were very 
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similar and inline with risk premium estimates obtained by the study conducted by 
Claus and Thomas (2001). The risk premium estimates for the USA was estimated by 
the two studies as 5.4. The risk premium value is abbreviated as (RM - RF) in the 
given Table Al A below. 
Step 4: 
Finally at the above elements of the cost of capital were feed on to an excel solver 
spreadsheet which calculated the cost of capital. 
The CAPM Formula = Ke =RF + ß*(risk premium) 
An extract example of the excel spreadsheets used to calculate the cost of capital is 
given below: - Table Al A. 
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Appendix 2 
Table App. 2 Details of the independent variables selected by this study 
Table 
App. 
2 Variable 
Formulae Notes 
This variable has been identified by 
Meric. G, et al (2002 and other dividend 
policy literature as a significant determinate 
of dividend policy. Debt ratio measures how 
much a company relies on debt to finance 
Debt ratio = assets. 
1 Total debt / Total assets 
Debt Ratio 
This variable has been identified by 
Meric. G, et al (2002 and other dividend 
policy literature as a significant determinate 
of dividend policy. Gearing ratio measures 
the percentage of capital employed that is 
financed by debt. Higher percentage of 
gearing ratio shows company is borrowing 
Loan Capital / total capital highly. 
2 Gearing employed 
Ratio 
Meric. G, et al (2002), identified leverage as 
a significant determinate of dividend policy. 
Total debt / Shareholder's Leverage is the degree to which a company 
3 Leverage equity utilises borrowed money. 
Ratio 
180 
Dividend policy (dividend This is the yield a company pays out to 
yield) = dividend per share / shareholders. 
4 Dividend share price Yield 
Dividend policy ( payout This compares the dividends paid to the 
Dividend ratio) = dividend paid /net earnings that are received by a company 
5 Payout income (profit) 
Ratio 
Meric. G, et al (2002) and other dividend 
policy literature identified profitability ratios 
Net Income (One yr's as a significant determinate of dividend 
earning)/ Shareholder's policy. 
6 Return on Equity 
Equity 
Meric. G, et al (2002) and other dividend 
policy literature identified profitability ratios 
as a significant determinate of dividend 
Net Income (One yr's policy. 
7 Return on earning)/ Total Assets 
Assets 
Meric. G, et al (2002), identified profitability 
ratios as a significant determinate of 
Net Income (One yr's dividend policy. 
Return on 
8 Capital earning)/ Capital Invested 
Invested _ ý__ 
181 
Revenue Revenue growth rate = This variable indicates the expansion of the 
9 Growth Total current revenue now company's revenues, hence shows Rate 
LESS previous revenue potential future organisations strength 
/previous revenue 
Income growth rate = This variable indicates the expansion of the 
Total current income now company's income, hence shows potential 
Income LESS previous future organisations strength 
10 Growth income/previous income 
Rate 
Dividend growth rate = This variable indicates the expansion of the 
Total dividend now LESS company's dividends 
Dividend previous dividend/previous 
11 Growth dividend 
Rate 
Percentage of the cash flow This measure the bank's liquidity 
in the share price = (Cash 
flows per share/ share price) 
*(100) = 
Percentage 
of the cash 
[(Cash flow / number of 
12 flow in the shares)/(Share price)]*100 
share price 
Tobin's Q Total market value of the The Tobin's Q ratios were published for 
Ratio 
company ( Price traders are each bank on the ADVFN database. 
13 welling to buy and sell This ratio indicates how healthy a company 
shares)/ Current cost of is in the view of the stock market. 
replacing firm's existing The Q ratio compares the value of a 
assets company given by financial markets with the 
Or value of a company's assets. Another use 
182 
Value of stock market /I for Q is to determine the valuation of the 
corporate net worth j market as a whole. The formula for this q is: 
[Tobin's Q ratios were 4 value of stock market / corporate net worth 
published by ADVFN for every Q ratio shows how the market views the 
NYSE bank] company. Tobin Q ratio greater than one is 
good. Shows that firm is worth more than 
value of its assts and has done well. A 
Tobin's Q greater than 1.0 shows that the 
market value is greater than the value of the 
company's recorded assets. This suggests 
that the market value reflects some 
unmeasured or unrecorded assets of the 
company. High Tobin's Q values encourage 
companies to invest more in capital 
investments because they are "worth" more 
than the price they paid for them. 
On the other hand, if Tobin's Q is less than 
1, the market value is less than the 
recorded value of the assets of the 
company. This suggests that the market 
may be undervaluing the company. 
Diversified companies tend to have a lower 
Q-ratio than focused, low risk firms because 
the market under-evaluate the value of the 
firm assets. 
183 
14 Share price 
/ Book 
value of 
assets 
Price / Book Ratio 
[Market to Book Value Ratio] 
This ratio indicates how a company is 
perceived by the market, 
Log of the 
15 Number of Size of the Bank 
This shows the size of the organisation 
employees 
Construction of DDR variable is detailed in 
chapter 5 of this thesis 
16 See Chapter 5 
DDR 
Appendix 3 -- 
Table App 3 below shows the statistics of banks listed on the NYSE as of August 
2006, the names of the banks listed on the NYSE are contained in Appendix 4 below. 
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Appendix 4- 
Appendix 4 below contains the list of banks listed on the NYSE as of August 2006. 
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Appendix 5 -- Some key aspects of the capital requirement regulation 
The capital requirement regulation sets a framework on how banks and depository 
institutions must handle their capital in relation to their assets. 
Internationally, the Bank for International Settlements's Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision influences each country's capital requirements. In 1988, the Committee 
decided to introduce a capital measurement system commonly referred to as the 
Basel Capital Accords (Basle I). The latest capital adequacy framework is commonly 
known as Basel II. 
The Basle I- The Basle Capital Accord 
The Basle I is the original accord to come from the Basel Committee, which ensures 
that financial institutions retain enough capital to protect themselves against 
unexpected losses from the banks assets. 
Banks should have adequate capital because capital serves as a financial shield to 
enable a bank to drive out earnings volatility (instability). The greater the potential for 
earnings volatility (i. e. riskier) the more capital a bank should hold. Since capital is 
more costly than other sources of funds, banks have more incentives to choose a 
level of capital that may not be appropriate to the risks they take and this is the 
underlying concern addressed by risk based capital regulation. In accordance with 
Basle I, banks should not go below the minimum capital adequacy. 
Basle I defined capital adequacy as a single number that is the ratio of a 
bank's 
capital to its assets. There are two types of capital: - tier one and 
tier two. The first is 
primarily core share capital and disclosed reserves and excludes 
preferred stock. The 
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second includes other types such as preference shares, undisclosed reserves, 
general loss reserves, and allowance for loan and lease losses and subordinated 
term debt. The key requirement was that total capital was at least 8% of assets. 
Basle I calculated capital adequacy as follows: 
Risk based capital adequacy = Capital / Risk Weighted Assets 
(Note: Minimum tier one capital should not be less than 4% of risk weighted assets 
and minimum tier two capital should not be less than 1.25% of risk weighted assets). 
or 
Total risk based capital adequacy = total capital (tier one capital plus tier two capital 
less certain deductions) / total risk weighted assets 
(Note: Total Risk based capital adequacy should not be less than 8%). 
Risk weighted Assets 
The risk-weighted assets are calculated by assigning each asset and off-balance- 
sheet item to one of four broad risk categories. These categories are assigned risk 
weights of 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent. Riskier assets are 
placed in the higher percentage categories. Very safe assets, such as government 
debt, have a zero weighting, high risk assets (such as unsecured loans) have a rating 
of 100%. Other assets have weightings somewhere in between. 
Commonwealth 
government securities with more than twelve months to maturity carry a 
10 per cent 
risk weighting, as do state government securities. 
Claims on other banks, Australian 
local governments and public-sector organisations, other 
than those with corporate 
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status or which operate commercially, carry a 20 per cent risk weighting. Loans 
secured by a mortgage over residential property and with a loan-to-valuation of 80 per 
cent or less carry a 50 per cent risk weighting and loans to companies or individuals 
carry a 100 per cent risk weighting. 
The weighted value of an asset is its value multiplied by the weight for that type of 
asset. 
The first Basle accord (Basle I) was issued on July 15,1988 and sets out the basics - 
such as credit risk. This was updated in 1996 to cover market risk and to clarify and 
extend the first Accord. The first Basel 1 accord currently, remains as the key method 
of calculating the US bank capital adequacy. However, since 2007 the larger US 
banking corporations have commenced introducing the uncomplicated versions of 
Basle II capital adequacy regulation to calculate the banking corporation's capital 
adequacy. Therefore, currently, in the US the larger banks are producing two sets of 
capital adequacy calculations for the regulators, the first set calculated in accordance 
with Basle I regulations, and the second set computed in accordance with one of the 
simple versions of Basle II capital adequacy accord. Currently, Basle I is the main 
method used to determine capital adequacy in the US and other relevant countries in 
the world. It is important to note, even at this stage of the thesis that this research 
study has used the Basle I's risk weighted assets calculations to estimate one of the 
key elements that this study requires. Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.2 details 
how the risk 
weighted assets calculations were utilised to estimate the required element. 
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The new Basel Capital Accord - The 'Basel il 
The Basel I accord is to be replaced, in stages, by new rules (Basel II), because 
Basel I was being regarded by many bank regulators as being crude and that it only 
accounted for credit risk and market risk, but Basle 11 enables enhanced risk 
monitoring by including operational risk and other risks. The second Basel Accord 
was finalized in 2004 after consulting extensively all members of the Basle 
committee. The Basle 11 accord is aimed at making the capital measures much more 
risk sensitive and itemizing and quantifying several more categories of risk. 
The new Basel framework known as Basel II - will replace the existing Basel i 
framework fully in 2008. Since Basle II was completed in 2004 the regulators around 
the world have been preparing for its implementation. 
The new framework (Basle II), is a non-binding agreement which has been in 
development since 1999 and it sets the standard for prudential regulation among the 
G-10 countries, although many other countries also seek to implement the framework. 
The new Basel capital accord's provisions are given legal force by the national 
legislatures and regulatory bodies, which commit to change any necessary banking 
laws and regulatory practices in order to abide by the standards and guidelines and 
statements of best practice. 
Basel II comprises three pillars: 
" Pillar 1: capital adequacy (minimum capital requirements). 
This "pillar" is similar to the Basel 1 requirements. It will indicate whether 
banks 
have capital appropriate for their risk taking activities. 
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" Pillar 2: supervisory disclosure (supervisory review process). 
Under pillar 2 banks supervise themselves by properly assessing the risk that 
they are taking when carrying out their activities and they have to disclose the 
risk. Under pillar 2 the bank supervisory institutions have to evaluate the 
soundness of the assessments disclosed by the bank. The second pillar 
makes use of sophisticated risk models to complete the pillar 2 calculations. 
For example, computer packages under pillar 2 can ascertain whether 
additional capital (i. e. more than required by pillar 1) is necessary . 
" Pillar 3: market discipline (market forces risk). 
The third pillar requires banks to disclose pertinent information necessary to 
enable market mechanism to complement the supervisory oversight function. 
Therefore, more disclosure of capital risks and risk management policies is 
required under pillar 3. This encourages the markets to react to the taking of 
high risks. 
The new framework will be more risk sensitive than Basel I, as Pillar 1 offers a menu 
of approaches of increasing sophistication for calculating credit and operational risk. 
This may give incentives to banks to improve their risk management practices by 
requiring them to hold appropriate regulatory capital as their risk management 
practices become more advanced. 
The new framework also recognises for the first time the use of risk mitigation, such 
as collateralisation and credit derivatives, and 
introduces a choice of methods of 
calculating the regulatory capital required to 
be held against securitisation exposures. 
Implementation of the Basel II framework for internationally active 
banks will pose 
problems of complexity and consistency 
for banks, that are active across international 
? 06 
borders, if different jurisdictions apply the provisions of the Basel II framework in 
different ways, for even the differences in application are quite subtle. 
The objective of the International Banking Federation (IBfeds)'s Basel II working party 
is to ensure the continuance of mutual recognition of Basle II between the major 
jurisdictions. The basic objective is to ensure that no institution will be subject to more 
than one interpretation of the new Accord in any jurisdiction because of home/host 
differences. To this end the industry strongly supports the development of a lead 
supervisory model. The lead (home state) supervisor would lead on the global 
supervision of a group and the approval process for the more advanced approaches. 
The host supervisor would lead on local implementation. The efforts of all would be 
coordinated in a college of supervisors. 
The industry strongly supports the efforts of the Accord Implementation Group, a sub- 
group of the Basel Committee, to ensure convergence in practice, which it will 
achieve by monitoring the implementation timetables and methodologies of regulators 
around the world and by meeting, where appropriate, with international groupings of 
regulators such as the Accord Implementation Group (AIG). 
All the calculations required by Basel II under pillars 1,2 and 3 are calculated by 
advanced computer packages. Unlike Basle 1, which has an optional risk reporting 
requirement, Basel II has a compulsory reporting requirement for all the risk 
management calculations, completed under pillars 1,2 and 
3. 
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